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Inequality in the Twenty-First Century
A Review on Rockstars of the Realm
Abstract
Not only has been economic inequality on the rise, but also the research agenda on 
inequality has moved decisively from the fringes to the center of policy and academic 
interest. This new concern and concentration in respect to this topic, data records, 
and methodological approaches have given rise to a vast amount of literature. It is for 
this reason that I review the most important recent works engaging with the origins 
of economic inequality – a debate which remains highly controversial. The usual 
categorization to explain the different storytelling – “to be or not to be neoliberal” – 
seems inappropriate. In this review on “the rockstars of the realm” (Thomas Piketty, 
Anthony Atkinson, Branko Milanovic and Walter Scheidel), I argue that the question 
and reason behind different approaches is instead: politics or the economy, which is 
the master that defines the space for action? The gradually established allegory of “the 
mirrored hourglass of inequality” illustrates the salience of this cleavage.
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Title image
1. Make Equality Great Again
Only days after the death of the so-called “Godfather” of modern inequality research, 
Anthony B. Atkinson, on 1 January 2017, the introductory sentence from a report by 
Oxfam spread around the globe: just eight men own the same wealth as the poorest half 
of the world (Oxfam 2017). In this report, Oxfam warns of the growing and dangerous 
concentration of wealth which is “beyond grotesque”. Such statistics are a matter of 
concern; and indeed, as in the same week the World Economic Forum held its annual 
conference in Davos, these numbers found their way into the debate.
This is much more than a numbers game: these are the hallmarks of an economic 
system that has forgotten about people. (…) Wealth does not trickle down to the 
poor. Oxfam knows this, the IMF knows this, the World Bank knows this. (WEF 
2017)
This view is endorsed by international organizations and leading politicians alike. The 
day after the signing of the coalition agreement in Germany in March 2018, headlines 
and front pages of leading media cited Chancellor Angela Merkel with the statement that 
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prosperity has to reach all citizens (SZ 2018, TSP 2018, SPON 2018). Yet as Thomas 
Piketty et al. in the World Inequality Report 2018 (WIR) reveal, we are a long way from 
achieving the proclamation.1 The good news is that first estimates from the report of 
how the growth in global income since 1980 has been distributed across the totality of 
the world population find that inequality between countries has dropped. The bad news 
is: inequality within countries was rising and the middle-class has been “squeezed” as 
the gap between the top and the bottom has steadily widened (WIL 2018: 11, 14). If 
in future “business as usual” continues, the authors of the WIR state, global inequality 
will further increase. That rising economic inequality presents a challenge and that 
considerations should be given may sound obvious. Inequality breeds crime (World 
Bank 2002, 2014), harms societies (Oishi et al. 2011, Wilkinson 2011) and is seen as 
the root of evil (Pope Francis 2014).
But it is only recently the research agenda has moved decisively from the fringes to 
the center of policy and academic interest, and also, that inequality is now framed as 
a phenomenon that “hurts everyone regardless of economic status” (Ingraham 2018).
The shift in the debate occurred after decades of the supremacy of neoliberalist thinking 
that understood inequality as a central driver for a creative, productive and dynamic 
society. This stance was previously embraced by neoliberalists whose convictions 
developed out of the opposition to the ideas of John Maynard Keynes2 and the prevailing 
view of strong interventions by governments. Friedrich August von Hayek and Milton 
Friedman are the ones whose names are mostly attached to this market ideology. Both 
received the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, both were members of the 
Mont Pelerin Society (MPS)3 and as such it was in their aim to establish and spread 
their neoliberal beliefs. The state had long been seen as necessary. As Adam Smith, 
the father of economics, wrote in Wealth of Nations:
It is only under the shelter of the civil magistrate that the owner of that valuable 
property, which is acquired by the labour of many years, or perhaps of many 
successive generations, can sleep a single night in security (Adam Smith 2007 
[1776]: 550).
But Hayek, Friedman and kindred spirits wanted to limit the power of governments and 
to unleash the powers of the market.
1 The World Inequality Report 2018 represents a compilation done by over one hundred researchers 
located over five continents that cover more than seventy countries in a consistent and systematic 
manner (WIL 2018: 26). Access to the WIR and the World Inequality Database (WID) is open to 
everyone.
2 Expressed in The End of Laissez-Faire from 1926.
3 Hayek was the founder.
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(A)t the heart of the ideas behind the new laissez-faire was a political and ethical 
theory that put primacy on the markets as the only means to satisfy want and 
reward labor, and this would become core of the new intellectual reorientation 
that would redefine the discourse on economic inequality (Thompson 2007: 
148).
The work of Hayek and Friedman laid the intellectual foundations for nearly four 
decades in Western societies. The foundation of the MPS in 1947 can be understood 
as the declaration of war on the interventionist approach current at the time, particularly 
the expansion of the welfare state. Hayek sought to win the “battle of ideas” in order 
to “discredit socialism and outline alternatives” (Butler 2012; Thompson 2007: 10). In 
the 1970s and 1980s, five Nobel Prizes in economics went to members of the MPS. 
In the late 1970s, Margaret Thatcher, at that moment being the new party leader, 
attended a Conservative Party policy meeting, interrupted a speaker that called for 
a pragmatic middle way, made a statement by taking out a book from her briefcase, 
while thumping The Constitution of Liberty written by Hayek on the table and said 
“(t)his is what we believe” (Ranelagh 1991). Apparently, it is not questionable that 
proponents of the neoliberal ideology had succeeded: the battle was won. “Over time”, 
as Michael Thompson observes, “this new market ideology has come to legitimize 
economic inequality as a necessary byproduct of capitalism” (Thompson 2007: 
145). Interpersonal inequality, in both Hayekʼs and Friedmanʼs opinion, resulted from 
interpersonal differences in skills and talents. According to neoliberal thinkers, market 
capitalism leads to the liquidation of class, it opens the door to social mobility and 
establishes equality of opportunity. Just as his descendants in the liberal tradition, John 
Locke – one of the founders of liberal political philosophy and limited government – 
stressed this aspect (Locke 2007 [1691], §4). But todayʼs analysis of Western societies 
reveals that family and social background become increasingly important and that the 
promise of capitalism has not been delivered; in the United States even less than in 
Europe (Blanden et al. 2013, Levmore 2015). Nonetheless, American citizens still hold 
on to the dishwasher-to-millionaire-story (OECD 2008). The distortion between reality 
and the external appearance from one perspective, and theory and beliefs in the US 
from the other are summed up cynically but appropriately by Saul Levmore:
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Viewed from Europe, the United States looks like a greedy place where the rich 
get richer, finance political candidates including themselves, resist providing 
health care and other necessities to the poor, and refuse to be taxed at just 
rates. But when Americans look in the mirror, they continue to see the American 
dream (Levmore 2015: 843).
It is not that there were no fights for equality in recent decades, but these were on the 
“horizontal axis” only, as between black and white, women and men, homosexuals 
and heterosexuals among others (Eribon 2009, Nachtwey 2012, Milanovic 2016). In 
Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequality Among Men from 1755, Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau conceives two “species of inequality among [wo]men”: the natural, or 
physical inequality which exists by nature and “consists in the difference of age, health, 
bodily strength, and the qualities of the mind, or the soul”; and the moral, or political 
inequality that is established, or at least authorized. “This species of inequality consists 
in the different privileges, which some [wo]men enjoy (…) such as that of being richer, 
more honored, more powerful” (Rousseau 2009 [1755]: 9). What Rousseau termed the 
natural inequality fits best the above mentioned horizontal axis; whereas the present 
use of the vertical axis that describes disparities between poor and rich fits best to 
Rousseauʼs term of political inequality. If one applies Rousseauʼs terms of inequality for 
recent decades, the earliest history of the analysis of inequality appears paradoxical: 
Whereas the focus laid on the horizontal axis by which minorities entered political 
fights based upon natural inequality (in order to establish political equality), the vertical 
axis or the disparities between rich and poor – to use Rousseauʼs term: the political 
inequality – was no political issue. By no means do I state that the horizontal axis is 
of no interest, but it should not, as stressed by many (Nachtwey 2012, Atkinson 2015, 
Milanovic 2016 among others) be the only or most important concern. By now, it is not: 
things have changed as the paradigm has shifted. Today, “We are the 99 percent”, 
or, as Nobel laureate and New York Times columnist Paul Krugman states, even the 
99.9 percent, as the 99 percent slogan aims too low (Krugman 2011). As Miles Corak 
shows:
Presidents and princes, popes and high priests of capitalism, all, it now seems, 
have an opinion on the nature and consequences of inequality, and they all think 
it is a problem worthy of public policy attention (Corak 2016: 368).
In 2016, Corak lists the most influential works on economic inequality: “Atkinson (2015), 
Milanovic (2016), OECD (2011, 2015a), and Piketty (2014).” I agree with him, yet in 
my opinion, Walter Scheidel’s book which was published a year after Corakʼs paper 
appeared, should be added. Furthermore, I would like to make another addition: the 
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two reports of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
to which Corak refers are Divided We stand: Why Inequality Keeps Rising from 2011, 
followed four years later by In It Together: Why Less Inequality Benefits All. It was an 
earlier report that started the ball rolling: Growing Unequal? (notice the question mark). 
In 2008, the OECD published this report which analyses key features and patterns of 
income inequality and searches for the winners and losers of globalization. What the 
OECD finds is an overall trend in growing income inequality which differentiates itself 
among the countries due to different government policies. Even if inequality is on the 
rise and governments can and should combat this issue, the OECD also stresses 
that a society with perfect equality is neither desirable nor legally feasible. But what 
should be aspired to is equality of opportunity – the concept that was not achieved by 
neoliberal policies and which, according to Oliver Nachtwey, fades the vertical logic of 
redistribution (Nachtwey 2017: 111-112). The report from the OECD of 2015 stresses 
that an ongoing trend of inequality raises both political and economic concerns and 
identifies main areas in which policy packages are required – now. On 24 January 
2018, Christine Lagarde, the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), expressed the same belief and idea that “there is no doubt that now is the 
right moment to act – the time to fix the roof is while the sun is shining” (IMF 2018). 
Coming back to Corak and overviewing the works he names, it is difficult to follow his 
hypothesis that two stories about inequality may be told. The tone set, according to 
him, will depend on ideological predispositions – whether you are neolibertarian, trust 
the market forces and do not want government to intervene; or if you have a collectivist 
view, you are afraid of market failures and understand government as a necessary 
force for good (Corak 2016: 369). Immediately following his assumption, he wants 
to present hard facts and pure data, stating that we deal with numbers that are not 
made up on the basis of any ideological predisposition. The problem is: there is no 
vacuum out of which data present itself in a pure way. There is always a story behind 
them. Data are, no doubt, hard – but the quality and scale of hardness depend on the 
forge they come from. It is later in his article that the author dismantles his ironic tune 
towards “hard data”: “I am certain the selective choice of start and end points is often 
made in public policy discussion” (p. 378).4 But to question the choice, you have to 
understand that there was one. Tables and figures are not engraved in stone but are 
developed by researchers. As has been presented, not only has inequality been on the 
rise, but also concern and concentration in respect to this topic, the data record, and 
methodological approaches. It is for this reason that I review the most important recent 
works on inequality. In the next section I introduce the method, establish the concept 
on which it is based and explain my decision behind the choice. Next I open the third 
part with a short presentation of my selection before I focus successively on each 
4  For reflections on data, see the Appendix.
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authorʼs books in turn. They all dedicate their research to economic inequality, call 
for interdisciplinary research and provide substantial new findings. Yet still, they differ 
substantially. In the last section I bring “the Four Angelists” together, integrate a critique 
of their research, show both their common ground and differences, while offering an 
explanation for their disputes. The established categorization to explain the different 
storytelling – neoliberal or not – seems inappropriate in the light of the analysis of the 
authors. As Corak states, they tell different stories, but not because of the question of 
whether “to be or not to be” neoliberal; and not only because they rely on different data. 
I think the question they are addressing is another one: Does politics give instructions 
to the economy or is it the economy that defines what politics has to do? Is politics an 
exogenous factor of the economy or is it endogenous to it?5 In the following I intend to 
show that this question is the key point of controversy in the debate about economic 
inequality, which yields different approaches about what needs to be done – or not.
2. Method: Get to the Point
As economic (or vertical) inequality moved from the periphery to the center of research 
and public interest, interested people are now faced with an increasingly large literature 
regarding both theoretical questions and policy recommendations over a huge range 
of particular aspects. It is therefore important to have these works reviewed in order to 
find their similarities and differences, to see if it is possible to generalize their findings 
and stimulate reflection and further research. A review does not present new findings 
on the chosen topic, rather the “main reason for doing a review is”, as the definition by 
Paul Glasziou expresses, “to provide a readable synthesis of the best of the current 
research literature on an important question or topic” (Glasziou 2013: 89). Hence this 
paper is characterized by working methodically (not theoretically), as carrying out a 
review may be comprehended as a scientific problem and method in itself (Fettke 
2006: 258). As such it is indispensable to take methodological guidelines into account. 
For this purpose, I establish a roadmap to both make a clear announcement of this 
journey through the mountains of information and to not lose sight the forest for the 
trees. A typology of fourteen different reviews from Maria J. Grant and Andrew Booth 
provides a useful overview of the variety of possibilities (Grant and Booth 2009). They 
offer various review types for which they offer a label and a descriptive insight pointing 
to their key characteristics, strengths and weaknesses. Another approach is presented 
by Peter Fettke (2006). This one comes without labeling, but categories upon which 
one has to decide for each characteristic. Taken together they complement each other 
5 In German, “Politik” embraces policy, polity, and politics. For simplicityʼʼs sake, I use politics; yet 
mean all three, or rather the German “Politik”.
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well. The following table expresses where a literature review fits in the realm of all 
possible reviews.
Table 1: Characterization of Reviews
Source: cf. Fettke 2006: 262. Legend: Two stars represent my choice; one star means I touch upon the 
category.
Based on the scheme presented above, my decisions for the literature review are 
as follows: I will write in natural language as words reach a broader audience than 
mathematical equations (I agree with Stephen Hawking, see p. 21).6 Furthermore, I 
orient my style towards Economical Writing by Deirdre N. McCloskey – an outstanding 
professor who treats economy like lyrics (FAZ 2013), strives for clarity beyond mere 
fluency, encourages academics to use more humor and states that “footnotes are 
nests for pedants” (McCloskey 2000, p.48). I did my best.7 In the next section I will 
introduce the work of four authors, namely Thomas Piketty, Anthony B. Atkinson, 
Branko Milanovic, and Walter Scheidel in chronological order. Within the meaning 
of a systematic review, first I chose the topic and research question (of similarities, 
differences, and the reason behind) and thereafter the best literature available to 
answer those questions (Glasziou 2013: 90). The authors chosen are the ones that 
are most influential in the recent debate on economic inequality as mentioned in the 
first section. The reasons for their selection is due to their contributions, expressed in 
the hyperbolic title that foreshadows their chapters and which I will present in the next 
section. The use of four key authors results in balancing the depth and breadth of the 
review in the scope of this paper. I aim to introduce key findings, to elaborate on their 
6 And allows irony – which I will move down to the footnotes whenever it originates from my pen. 
McCloskey would welcome it (2000: 43) and Piketty shows the way (in his footnotes, too).
7 But I must admit that I use more footnotes than McCloskey would endorse.
Characteristic Category
1. Style natural language** mathematical-statistical
2. Focus research results** theory* research method* experience
3. Goal
Formulation explicit** not explicit
Content central topics** critique* integration
4. Perspective neutral** position
5. Literature
Selection explicit** not explicit
Scope key works** representative selective complete
6. Structure topical** methodological* historical
7. Audience researchers** practitioners** experts** public*
8. Future Research explicit** not explicit
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views and to incorporate the author’s approaches and methods as I wish to provide a 
comprehensible comparison. Of first priority is the introduction of key findings and to 
“get to the point” (McCloskey 2000: 11); but I will also present and formulate critiques 
of their work, aiming to do this from a neutral perspective (toward the authors) and ask 
for the reason why the “messages” of the “Angelists” or their stories (in the words of 
Corak 2016) are quite diverse. As the topic of economic inequality and the research 
question came before the literature choice, I avoid selecting work “that supports [my] 
world view, lending undue credence to a preferred hypothesis” (Grant and Booth 2009: 
97). Yet a “weakness” of literature review which applies is a missing maximizing scope.
Any conclusions [literature reviews] may reach are therefore open to bias from 
the potential to omit, perhaps inadvertently, significant sections of the literature 
(Grant and Booth 2009: 97).
This holds true for my final conclusion concerning why different messages or stories 
are told; thus the findings provided here have to be treated with caution and represent 
a first approximation to this question which requires further research.
The goal of this paper is clear: Ultimately, I would like those interested in economic 
inequality – be they students from different backgrounds, the practitioner and decision 
makers in politics, or experts in inequality – to receive an overview of the most recent 
and influential contributions to the debate and sharpen their reflections in the sense that 
they question the work and perspectives of each author regarding economic inequality.
3. The Four Angelists
There can be no shadow of a doubt that we owe it to Thomas Piketty with his publication 
of Capital in the Twenty-First Century in 2014 that the topic of inequality reached center-
stage in public discourse. As The Economist wrote: “It is the economics book that took 
the world by storm” (The Economist 2014). From Beijing to Berlin, Piketty, professor at 
the École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS) and associate chairperson 
at the Paris School of Economics, travelled the world to present his bestseller. He 
emphasizes the role of wealth concentration and distribution and breaks down his 
theory into one formula, underpinned by data from the last 250 years: r>g. Piketty 
argues that the rate of return on capital r exceeds the rate of economic growth g and 
that this leads to growing wealth concentration and rising inequality. But as the system 
has been designed, it can be modified, and the relation of r and g reversed: a global 
progressive taxation on capital would address this problem.
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Proposals from Anthony B. Atkinson, the “Godfather” of modern income inequality 
research, run in the same vein: the solution for problems of inequality lie in our hands. 
This does not come as a surprise given the joint work of Piketty and Atkinson since 
they first met at the London School of Economics in 1991. Back then, Piketty was a 
young student while Atkinson was an established researcher, known for his academic 
contributions which would finally span half a century, covering more than forty books 
and 350 scholarly articles (Piketty 2017). As Atkinson himself states, in the 1980s to 
the mid 1990s his work “fell on deaf ears, largely” (Atkinson and Stern 2017: 13). This 
changed when he wrote a report in 1995 which was the first work in 20 years that 
the OECD had published on income distribution (Atkinson et al. 1995). In Inequality. 
What can be done?, published in 2015, Atkinson demonstrates that constraints for his 
proposals are purely political, not economic. This marks him a genuine “possibilist” 
as he “sharpen(s) the perception of available avenues towards change” (Hirschman 
1971: 37, see also Lepenies 2008) and brings the book of Piketty to the next level (FAZ 
2016, Hollanders 2016).
The third author that cannot be overlooked is Branko Milanovic. Currently professor 
at the City University of New York, Milanovic was previously a lead economist for the 
World Bank. With Global Inequality. A New Approach for the Age of Globalization 
(2016), Milanovic provides a study of inequality both within and among countries, a 
“must-read”, as Piketty notes. Beyond that, Milanovic introduces the model of “Kuznets 
circles” or “waves”. This new approach is, as the name suggests, based on the “Kuznets 
curve”, developed by Simon Kuznets in 1955. Kuznets assumed
a long swing in the inequality characterizing the secular income structure: 
widening in the early phases of economic growth when the transition from the 
pre-industrial to the industrial civilization was most rapid; becoming stabilized 
for a while; and then narrowing in the later phases (Kuznets 1955: 18).
Graphically displayed, the level of income plotted against the level of inequality would 
show an inverted u-shape. What seems perfectly clear in theory turns out not to be 
compatible with what we have observed in several countries since the 1980s. The 
problem, however, is that for decades, no new approach has emerged to replace the 
Kuznets curve that would have been capable to explain the growing level of inequality. 
Then came Piketty. Milanovic criticizes that while Kuznets cannot explain the inequality 
increase after 1980, Pikettyʼs theory fails to be applicable for the time before the 
twentieth century. While Piketty dismisses the Kuznets curve completely, Milanovic 
embraces and extends the curve, converting it into a wave.
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Yet what these economists – all of them – have in common, is the explicit desire for 
interdisciplinary work on the topic. With The Great Leveler. Violence and the History of 
Inequality from the Stone Age to the Twenty-First Century (2017), the historian Walter 
Scheidel of Stanford University has welcomed this call. Echoing the wish, it is on the 
very first and last pages on which he refers to Branko Milanovic, Thomas Piketty and 
Anthony Atkinson. In this manner, he puts himself squarely in the interdisciplinary 
scientific discourse about inequality, self-confidently and well-knowing that he gives 
another impetus to the literature as he analyzes the entire history of inequality since 
the dawn of mankind. As Scheidel puts it, the challenge of inequality has only recently 
been an upcoming concern. Yet inequalityʼs history “runs deep” (Scheidel 2017: xv) 
and despite an enormous amount of attention towards this issue, a cross-cultural, 
comparative, and long-term perspective of its evolution had yet to be written. At the 
core of his work lie the arguments that first, high levels of inequality are the rule and not 
the exception ever since societies generated an economic surplus; and second, that 
massive violent shocks in form of the “Four [apocalyptic] Horsemen” war, revolution, 
state failure, and plague alone have been able to reduce economic inequality.
Figure 1: Stylized inequality trends in Europe in the long run
Source: Scheidel 2017: 87; own compilation.
Taken together, I consider that the four authors – or following the visual vocabulary of 
Scheidel, “the Four Angelists” (as they proclaim no good news, but groundbreaking 
findings)8 – tell four different stories, based upon different questions, theoretical 
grounds and using different tools to reach their various goals. Before I present them in 
comparison and interpret their findings, I examine each single author in turn.
3.1 Piketty: Itʼs the r > g, Stupid
Pikettyʼs Capital in the Twenty-First Century (in the following, “C21”) is based upon one 
central equation: r > g, where r is the rate of return on capital and g stands for the rate 
8  Evangelist comes from the Ancient Greek: εὐαγγέλιον eu-angélion; eu means good, angélion news.
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of growth in an economy (Piketty 2014a: 25). This formula derives from the observation 
that the rate of return available to an investor in capital manages to surpass the rate 
of growth available to the majority of the population. A person that inherited a huge 
fortune may lay back and see her wealth increase through good investments whereas 
by contrast, the average person must rely on income from work. Over the long haul, 
the gap between the two will rise and economic inequality will become bigger. In a 
nutshell this means that the “haves” become increasingly richer while the “have-nots” 
have to hustle.
3.1.1 The Structure of Inequality
In C21, Piketty dedicates the third out of four parts (and six out of sixteen chapters) 
to the topic of the structure that lies behind inequality. In this part, he examines the 
distribution of this phenomenon at the individual level and puts his overarching thesis 
on two pillars. As the following statement reveals, the first consists of the assumption 
that decisions and differences on an institutional and political level have had been of 
crucial importance.
(T)he two world wars, and the public policies that followed from them, played 
a central role in reducing inequalities in the twentieth century. There was 
nothing natural or spontaneous about this process, in contrast to the optimistic 
predictions of Kuznetsʼs theory (C21: 237).
The second pillar consists of the role of inherited wealth.9 But before delving any deeper 
into the subject, some simple thoughts about the concept of inequality may be useful. 
If we want to analyze inequality, it is best to first take a look at its composition and then 
decompose it. Inequality may be decomposed into three terms:
1. Inequality in income from labor
2. Inequality in income from the ownership of capital
3. The interaction between these two
Thus by definition, income inequality is the sum of inequality from the two components, 
labor and capital.
9 He had devoted particular attention to this aspect already in 2000 in his contribution to the first 
volume of the Handbook of Income Distribution with a chapter titled “Theories of Persistent Inequality 
and Intergenerational Mobility”.
12 | Linartas - Inequality in the Twenty-First Century: A Review on Rockstars of the Realm
As the level of analysis is the individual one, it is a smart and intriguing move to introduce 
these issues with a literary anecdote, as this way of proceeding offers a narrative to 
illustrate the data. Piketty uses Père Goriot from 1835 of the French Novelist Honoré 
de Balzac from the Belle Époque to make his points clear. In this novel, Vautrin has to 
learn that hard work and dedication would not be enough to achieve the same standard 
of living as is achievable coming from an inheritance and the capital which derives from 
it. These conditions describe the structure of France and Britain in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth century until the first decades after World War II, when inheritance lost at 
least some of its relative importance. But the questions are:
First, can we be sure that the relative importance of income from labor versus 
income from inherited wealth has been transformed since the time of Vautrin, 
and if so, to what extent? Second, and even more important, if we assume that 
such a transformation has to some degree occurred, why exactly did it happen, 
and can it be reversed (C21: 242)? 
In order to answer the questions he posed, Piketty analyzes the inequalities with 
respect to labor and capital and presents the following findings:
• Inequality with respect to capital is always greater than inequality with respect to 
labor.
• Inequalities with respect to labor are moderate while inequalities with respect to 
capital are extreme.
• A historical change of the structure took place as the “Patrimonial Middle Class” 
was established. Balzacʼs lesson is not sustainable anymore: a marriage into a 
rich family cannot be understood as a prerequisite to living comfortably.
As there are two different ways to achieve an unequal distribution of total income, it 
is necessary to study the interplay of inequality in respect to labor and capital – which 
changed in an unknown manner. A new phenomenon, rooted in the United States, came 
into play: the “Hypermeritocratic Society”. By definition, this society is characterized by 
a “peak of the income hierarchy (…) dominated by very high incomes from labor rather 
than by inherited wealth” (C21: 265).
These issues and findings form the basis for the following study of the structure of 
inequality. Piketty analyses France and the United States (US) as their evolution of 
income and wages is by far the best documented. Both countries had a compression 
of inequality after the shocks of the period 1914-1945. But because the increase in 
inequality in the time after has developed differently, Piketty reaffirms his suggestion 
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“that institutional and political factors played a key role” (p. 271). The case of France 
is representative for other continental European countries as well as for Japan, too. 
Analyzing the income inequality from 1910-2010 of total, labor and capital income 
leads to three important observations. First, “income inequality has greatly diminished 
in France since the Belle Époque” (p. 271).10 Second, the reduction of inequality 
was largely due to the fall of top incomes from capital. Lastly, he concludes that the 
history of inequality is political and chaotic – which is true not only for France but for 
every country (p. 286). It is essential to understand that not only economic factors 
and processes, but political, social, cultural and military, too, form different dimensions 
that finally intertwine and form the history of the distribution of wealth. In the history 
of France, it is the period of 1914-1945 when things changed to the extreme. It was 
“the chaos of war [in contrast to harmonious democratic or economic rationality] that 
erased the past and enabled society to begin anew with a clean slate” (p. 275). A 
profound change which took place happened especially in the composition of top 
incomes. Piketty talks about the change from a “Society of Rentiers” to a “Society of 
Managers”. By this he means that nowadays one has to be at a much higher level 
within the distribution of incomes until income from capital outweighs income from 
labor. As this is the case, Piketty subdivides the top decile into the 9 percent and the 1 
percent for which income from capital is still the decisive factor and income from labor 
becomes gradually supplementary.
In the case of France (and as Piketty prefers long-time periods of at least thirty to forty 
years) the two periods of interest are the sharp decline of inequality in the period of 
1914-1945 and the following time from 1945-2010. Based on data from these periods, 
Piketty formulates the hypothesis that “inequality tends to evolve procyclically (that 
is, it moves in the same direction as the economic cycle)” (p. 288). A remarkable 
phenomenon within the second is the emergence of the very top salaries in France 
since 1990. Even though these are remarkable, there is no comparable society which 
had such an impressive emergence of a subclass of “supermanagers” (p. 291) of large 
firms with very high incomes as the US. Comparing France and the US, the most 
obvious observation is that the US has become more inegalitarian within the same 
time period. Although the inequality started at a lower level, by 2010 it was as high 
as in the Belle Époque in Europe but it is important to note that it was structured 
differently. The biggest change of the structure had its beginning in 1980 when an 
extreme divergence between social groups gained ground. The numbers leave no 
room for doubt that inequality rose to the highest extent due to (both in relative and 
10 The data depict a considerable drop of inequality of primary incomes (before taxes and transfers), 
with the share of the top income decile falling from extreme inequality in the Belle Époque with 45 
percent to 30 percent after 1945 and subsequently increasing somewhat to 35 percent today.
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absolute terms) enormous income growth of the richest 1 percent. A decomposition 
such as the one Piketty uses for his analysis of inequality, permits further conclusions 
and suggests that it was the increase of wages of “supermanagers” more than the 
growth of income from capital which explains most of the inequality increase in the 
American society. So finally, what we observe is a change from a society of rentiers to 
a society of managers.
But what were the reasons for this structural change and advent of supermanagers? 
In Pikettyʼs view, the most common theory which puts a race between education and 
technology as the explanation, is in some respects “limited and naïve” (p. 305).11 What 
Piketty brings in is the hypothesis of imperfect information which makes it difficult if 
not impossible to assess someoneʼs contribution to the firmʼs output; or in economic 
jargon, someoneʼs ‘individual marginal productivity’. As he writes:
It is only reasonable to assume that people in a position to set their own salaries 
have a natural incentive to treat themselves generously. (…) To behave in this way 
is only human, especially since the necessary information [of each managerʼs 
contribution to the firmʼs output] is, in objective terms, highly imperfect. It may 
be excessive to accuse senior executives of having their “hands in the till”, but 
the metaphor is probably more apt than Adam Smithʼs metaphor of the marketʼs 
“invisible hand” (C21: 332).
The explanation then for the appearance of supermanagers in the US12 is thus the 
acceptance of very high wages relative to other countries where managers could 
not go as far as their colleagues in the US. Different institutions and different social 
norms prevent them from doing so. In addition, data about individual firms prove the 
assumption that it is difficult to justify very high salaries (and very high differences 
among top managers) in terms of company performance. The question then would be 
where the social norms come from. And this is the point in the book where the very 
need of interdisciplinary work involving different sciences – in order to fully illuminate 
the phenomenon of inequality – becomes most clear because this is “obviously a 
question of sociology, psychology, cultural and political history, and the study of beliefs 
and perceptions at least as much as for economics per se” (p. 333). However, if the 
remuneration of the top managers is linked to social norms and once it is accepted that 
11 In a nutshell, the theory is based on the first hypothesis which states that a workerʼs wage is equal 
to his marginal productivity and on the second hypothesis that the workerʼs productivity depends on 
his skill and on supply and demand for this skill in a given society.
12  And to a lesser extent also in other Anglo-Saxon economies.
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they set their own salaries, this could lead to a spiral that could increase still further the 
already excessive income gap.
While the structure of (inequality of) labor changed in the last three decades, this was 
not the case in times when income inequality in total dropped sharply.13 Instead income 
inequality in total decreased when incomes from capital declined (in 1900-1910 and 
1950-1960). To examine the relation of the factors which lead to this event, Piketty 
uses wealth data from four countries – France, Britain, the United States and Sweden 
– which go much further back in history than data on income. This data show that there 
was an impressive concentration of wealth in all four countries: prior to the shocks of 
World War I, the top decile owned 80 to 90 percent of the total wealth, the top 1 percent 
between 45 to 60 percent (see Figure 2). At no moment was there a reduction, but, on 
the contrary, a slight but stable growth of the share of the rich. 
Figure 2: Wealth Share of the Top 10%, the Next 40% and the Bottom 50% in 







Prior to WW I Present
Bottom 50% Next 40% Top 10%
Source: Data from Piketty 2014a: 346-350; own compilation.
Even the French Revolution did not change the vast concentration of capital:
France remained the same society, with the same basic structure of inequality, 
from the Ancient Régime to the Third Republic, despite the vast economic and 
political changes that took place in the interim (C21: 342).
This development also applies to Britain and Sweden and seems to be a general 
phenomenon for continental Europe. By now, the wealth share of the top ten percent 
is at 60 to 70 percent – still very high but far below the level of one century ago. The 
13  This stands in contrast to the Kuznets hypothesis.
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loss of the top decile (from 90 to 60 percent) goes in total to the next 40 percent, to 
the so-called “Patrimonial Middle Class” (p. 346). They own one-quarter to one-third 
of nationʼs total wealth while the poorest half of the population owns between 5 to 10 
percent.
On the other side of the Atlantic the top decileʼs share of wealth started at a lower level 
of 80 percent but dropped to only 70 percent. Unlike the European case, today, the 
inequality of wealth in the US is higher than it was a century ago.
In short, the reason for the observed developments lies in the fact that throughout 
the centuries the return on capital r was significantly higher than the growth rate g, as 
stated earlier is expressed by the formula r > g. This may be not the only mechanism 
responsible for the hyper concentration of wealth, but according to Piketty it is the 
“primary” one. A relation of g to r in a relation of one to five, as it was the case over 
the period examined,14 creates perfect conditions for an “Inheritance Society”, defined 
by Piketty as “a society characterized by both a very high concentration of wealth 
and a significant persistence of large fortunes from generation to generation” (p. 351). 
Looking at the world level from antiquity until the present and comparing the rate of 
return to capital r (pretax) and the growth rate of world output g, the most striking fact 
is that the rate of return to capital has always been higher. Taking into account the after 
tax rates of return versus the growth rate at the world level, it is astonishing to note that 
after World War I, it was the first time in history that the return to capital r has fallen 
under the growth rate or world output g. As noted before, the world wars meant a huge 
destruction of capital. Also, directly after the war period, progressive tax policies were 
gaining ground. These two circumstances in addition to the high growth rate of world 
output after the world wars let the two rates r and g switch their positions for nearly a 
century (g > r). But according to Piketty’s predictions, the trend will topple, and taxes 
on capital will be close to zero (p. 355) and global growth (being “most excessively 
optimistic” when assuming it to be at a rate of 1.5 percent a year) will at no moment 
outperform the rate of return on capital.
But why did we not come back to the inequality level of the Belle Époque? Piketty does 
not claim to be able to provide a fully satisfactory answer to this question. The easiest 
part to explain is the severe destruction of capital during the world wars and thus the 
changed capital/growth ratio. In general terms, the reason is in part a question of time: 
“capital accumulation is a long-term process extending over several generations” (p. 
372). Or to express it simply: capital takes its time to rise. But as the concentration 
14  “I take this to be a historical fact, not a logical necessity”, Piketty 2014a: 353, 358-361.
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of wealth has decreased, the earned income hierarchy is expanding, and wealth and 
income are increasingly correlated, thus the structure of inequality will not look like it did 
before. With these caveats, let me state that the overall importance of inherited wealth 
is once again nearly as high as it was in the nineteenth century – and this has far-
reaching consequences with regard to extreme concentration of wealth, as “beyond a 
certain threshold, capital tends to reproduce itself and accumulates exponentially. The 
logic of r>g implies that the entrepreneur always tends to turn into a rentier” (p. 395). 
For the future, Piketty predicts that the cumulative process will become even more rapid 
and inegalitarian, as the population will become older and bequeath inheritances later 
but in larger amounts. This means that the importance of inherited wealth will remain 
high, strengthening inequality further as inherited wealth is distributed “in a highly 
inegalitarian fashion” (p. 407). And the ongoing and widening divergence between 
capital and labor will not, as Piketty stresses, vanish if markets become freer and more 
competitive: “The idea that unrestricted competition will put an end to inheritance and 
move toward a more meritocratic world is a dangerous illusion” (p. 424).
3.1.2 Global Inequality of Wealth
After the analysis of inequality of wealth mostly within nations, Piketty faces the dynamics 
of wealth inequality on a global level and focuses on r. The question is whether there 
exist structural reasons for wealthier people receiving a higher return on their capital. 
Unfortunately, if it comes to the super-wealthy, we lack reliable information and have to 
use magazine rankings such as the Forbes List of large fortunes even if these are quite 
limited, and inaccurate methods lead to statistical bias (e.g. underestimation of the size 
of inherited fortunes, pp. 441-442).15 However, Forbes, publishing statistics since 1987, 
shows that there has been a huge rise of billionaires and their share in aggregate private 
wealth: in 1987 they counted 140 billionaires who owned 0.4 percent of global wealth; 
when Piketty wrote in 2013 there were 1400 billionaires collectively worth 5.4 trillion 
dollars and owning 1.5 percent. In 2018, Forbes lists over 2,200 billionaires, being 
worth in total 9.1 trillion dollars (Forbes 2018). As the analysis shows, they recorded 
an average growth rate of 6.8 percent above inflation, compared to the average global 
wealth per capita of 2.1 percent, whereas average global income increased by 1.4 
percent only. This permits two clear statements: first, that wealth grew faster than 
income and largest fortunes grew by far much more than average wealth. And second, 
as a consequence from the first finding, the more wealth you have at the beginning, the 
15 Piketty stresses how regrettable it is that national governments and statistical agencies should 
understand their methods and effort as insufficient – a challenge which they should acknowledge 
and take on, because “in the absence of reliable information about the global distribution of wealth, 
it is possible to say anything and everything and to feed fantasies of all kinds” (p. 437).
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more you will receive at the end – the divergence amplifies exponentially. Piketty calls 
this divergence “spectacular” (p. 435) and indeed, it is. With higher return on capital 
than average, the divergence becomes bigger and the share of the rich does, too. 
This seemingly endless accumulation and distribution of wealth holds great potential 
for problems and lacks any rational justification in terms of social utility. What has to 
be done is to control democratically this social time bomb without at the same time 
clipping the wings of entrepreneurs and disrupting the international orientation of the 
economy. Piketty offers a solution:
(A) progressive tax on the largest fortunes worldwide. (…) The advantage of a 
progressive tax on capital is that it provides a way to treat different situations in 
a supple, consistent, and predictable manner while exposing large fortunes to 
democratic control – which is already quite a lot. (C21: 444)
In order to understand why taxation of capital is the best solution in the fight against a 
never-ending spiral of growing inequality, it is not sufficient to only consider the pros 
and cons of taxes as an instrument. It is also necessary to dismantle other instruments 
of fiscal and monetary policy as less adequate.
To do so, he shows that the widely spread myth, according to which inflation is considered 
to be the enemy of rentiers, is wrong. Inflation ultimately supports the wealthiest and 
makes inequality become even bigger. Another issue of interest is the rise of sovereign 
wealth funds (SWF). As state-owned investment funds have grown tremendously 
(according to the SWF Institute, they doubled within a decade), sovereign wealth 
funds own approximately 1.5 percent of the worldʼs total private wealth – as much 
as billionaires. The worldʼs largest SWF is from oil-rich Norway; when Piketty wrote 
his book in 2013, it was worth 700 billion dollars. In September 2017, the Norwegian 
SWF made the news when it reached the 1 trillion dollar mark. The CEO from the 
Central Norges Bank who manages the fund, appeared surprised: “I don’t think anyone 
expected the fund to ever reach 1 trillion dollars when the first transfer of oil revenue 
was made in May 1996” (CNBC 2017). Apart from inflation and SWFs, another major 
issue is introduced by the simple question of whether China will eventually own the 
world. Chinaʼs interest in high levels of investment in Africa is said to come possibly 
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from neocolonial ambitions, which “could give rise to serious tensions” (p. 461).16 
However, whether we talk about a SWF or a huge national economy: the inequality r>g 
can bring nothing but a steadily growing divergence in the capital distribution. In the 
summarizing words of Piketty:
As global growth slows and international competition for capital heats up, there 
is every reason to believe that r will be much greater than g in the decades 
ahead. If we add to this the fact that the return on capital increases with the size 
of the initial endowment, (…) then clearly all the ingredients are in place for the 
top centile and thousandth of the global wealth distribution to pull farther and 
farther ahead of the rest (C21: 463).
Under the given conditions of r > g it is not a question of whether the divergence will 
grow but a question of which type of divergence it will be. According to Piketty the 
oligarchic types of divergence,
that is, a process in which the rich countries would come to be owned by their 
own billionaires or, more generally, in which all countries (…) would come to be 
owned more and more by the planetʼs billionaires and multimillionaires [is a] 
process well under way (C21: 463).
After the analysis of the global inequality in the twenty-first century, its dynamics, 
structures, forces and issues, Piketty arrives at the conclusion that the given inequality 
is a major challenge that we can meet only in a coordinated and broad (regional) 
level. His proposal of a progressive tax on capital meets the criteria. Piketty is fully 
aware of the utopian character of this proposal thus he examines the possibilities and 
necessities of such a tax within the political landscape and calls the utopian concept 
useful as it serves as a worthwhile reference point.
16 I would like to make an exception at this point and make aware for the political dynamite of the polemic 
assumption that China could have neocolonial ambitions. Let me be clear: I neither want to judge or 
speculate about China’s intentions nor is it my intention to accuse Piketty of such conjectures, as he 
calls prevalent fears of growing Chinese ownership a “pure fantasy” (p. 463). But it is important to 
make clear that it was not China that forced Africa to decrease trade tariffs and open the marketplace, 
but instead the World Trade Organization. In the first place, Chinese investment should be seen not 
a sign of any particular aspiration, but a consequence of a ‘pure and free marketʼ.
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3.1.3 Regulating Capital in the Twenty-First Century
In the fourth part of his book, Piketty scrutinizes the “regulating (of) capital in the 
twenty-first century” (p. 497). On the one hand, he shows how (progressive) taxation 
evolved over the long run of the twentieth century. As with capital, the world wars and 
political changes resulting from it played a crucial role for the introduction of progressive 
taxation, without which a consolidation of social welfare systems would not have been 
possible (p. 497). On the other hand, he points out what is at stake if no changes will 
occur: first, as most recently the Oxfam report showed, inequality will reach extreme 
and unsustainable dimensions and as Piketty stresses, “(i)f the tax system is not made 
more progressive, it should come as no surprise that those who derive the least benefit 
from free trade may well turn against it” (p. 497). A progressive tax would not only put 
an end to inequality but first and foremost help to regulate capital while promoting and 
requiring international financial transparency (p. 518) and help avoiding crises as it 
would leave less room for conjecture and speculation. In this sense, “(i)t is important to 
understand that a tax is always more than just a tax: it is also a way of defining norms 
and categories and imposing a legal framework on economic activity” (p. 520). The 
most important justification for this tax can be seen in the fact that capital is a better 
indicator for wealthy people than income. Thus, a tax on capital has to be supplementary 
to the tax on income (as income becomes increasingly more unimportant the higher 
one climbs the ladder of the social hierarchy). Finally, Piketty calls for all three types 
of tax (on inheritance, income and capital) to be of complementary use. As capital 
is flexible and does not stop at national borders, a tax on capital in one country only 
would not bring the desired benefits. It needs to be implemented either in huge national 
economies like the US and China or at the European level in order to be effective. 
At the end of his analysis, including what he claims is more extensive data than any 
previous author has assembled (p. 571), Piketty asks one further question: “Is there 
no alternative to the capital tax?” And the simple answer is: “No” (p. 534). Further 
challenges and issues remain which Piketty introduces (as the question of public debt, 
immigration, and the role of central banks, among others). His proposals of a further 
European unification, a creation of a budgetary parliament and an introduction of a 
European finance minister represent the requirements he identifies (pp. 558-562). 
Bearing in mind that right populist parties across Europe oppose fiercely any further 
European integration, this thrust to construct new continental instruments leads to the 
question of feasibility. Against this reproach, Piketty applies a cunning comparison: 
“Are all these proposals utopian? No more so than attempting to create a stateless 
currency” (p. 561). If one is to believe and follow the argumentation of Piketty, the 
progressive tax on capital addresses the root causes of the unlimited growth of global 
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inequality of wealth and could help overcome challenges of the societies of the twenty-
first century. The biggest hurdle is the requirement of a high level of international 
cooperation among the entire European Union and a further integration of the EU. Let 
me end with the words of Piketty: “If we are to regain control of capitalism, we must bet 
everything on democracy – and in Europe, democracy on a European scale” (p. 573).
3.2 Atkinson: Yes, We Can
The book Inequality: What can be Done? by Anthony B. Atkinson is divided into 
three sections. The second part is most remarkable as it presents fifteen proposals 
and further ideas to pursue in order to reduce inequality. In the third part, Atkinson 
discusses objections and concerns deriving from his recommendations, before 
he finally summarizes and illuminates the way forward. The book is directed at the 
general reader – and as such, according to a saying of Stephen Hawking, it is devoid of 
equations as “every equation halves the number of readers” (Atkinson 2015: 6). Before 
I start with Atkinsonʼs proposals, let me briefly highlight the most important aspects 
from the first part to both show his broadly-based analysis and present the elementary 
aspects on which ground he establishes his proposals.
In the beginning, Atkinson takes a deep breath before he reaches out to formulate his 
comprehensive set of policies to deal with inequality – as if passing through the wide 
nature of the subject was a condicio sine qua non to ensure the utmost precision. The 
goal he defines is a significant reduction of inequality. The reason for his endeavor 
can be distinguished as instrumental or of intrinsic nature. Instrumental in this sense 
means that inequality generates bad consequences for societies.17 But there are also 
intrinsic reasons which may reveal an unsustainable level of inequality. The concept 
of equal opportunity that dominates present research and debates is important;18 
yet more so is the outcome of inequality as, according to the capacity approach of 
Amartya Sen, not only access to primary goods counts (Rawls 1971), but whether 
one possesses the ability to convert these primary goods into living well (Sen 2009), 
as “today’s ex-post outcomes shape tomorrow’s ex-ante playing field” (Atkinson 2015: 
11). After Atkinson has “set the scene”, he looks in the past in order to draw lessons 
for the future. As the scene is set mostly upon data reaching back to the beginning of 
the twentieth century, so do his questions target events within this time period in which 
17 Likewise higher criminality, a lack of social cohesion, ill-health and further social problems; but also, 
less macroeconomic stability and less economic growth, pp. 11-12.
18  See Stiglitz 2013, Krugman 2015b, Knee 2015.
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we can observe salient reductions in inequality.19 The two world wars caused a huge 
inequality reduction. Figure 3 helps to identify the different elements which came into 
play in the US, in a nutshell: the most important changes were that women came into 
the job market (adding another earning individual to households) and a huge growth 
of government transfers that took place. Two country case studies from Europe show 
what happened on the other side of the Atlantic after 1945. The market income gap 
widened in the United Kingdom (UK) and Germany until the 1980s. But the tax and 
transfer systems were able to reduce inequality to such an extent that the household 
income gap did not show an upward trend at all. After 1984, policy decisions taken in 
the UK changed the pattern and caused post-tax-inequality to rise sharply (p. 66).20 
Conversely, the German welfare system was able to prevent any rise in household 
inequalities.
Figure 3: Guide to Household Income
Source: Own elaboration, based on Atkinson 2015: 30.
19 Salient is defined as a 3 (or more) percentage point reduction in the Gini coefficient, poverty rate, 
and top income shares; and a 5 percent change in the ratio of the top decile to the median (pp. 55, 
312).
20 As data of the changes in earnings in the UK since 1977 show, big alterations occurred, and it is 
striking that “(t)he action was at the tails” (p. 105). The question that Atkinsons would like to find 
its way into todayʼs media discussion and policy debate – “Who gains and who loses?” – is easily 
answered. But, until now, there has been no such dispute (p. 5).
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In the course of time, mechanisms that were responsible for the reduction of inequality 
either stopped operating or reversed their direction – and this, according to Atkinson, 
is the main reason why the process of equalization “came to an end” (p. 75). Recent 
developments in Latin America offer different results. Within the last twenty years, poverty 
rates and the Gini coefficient (an index to measure inequality that goes from 0 to 1; a 
lower Gini number means lower inequality) fell in a number of countries. As the countries 
have had different economic growth patterns and political regimes, the findings show 
that there is no clear link between a falling inequality and those factors. Instead, “(i)n 
Latin America, as in the postwar decades in Europe, inequality reduction was achieved 
by a combination of changes in market incomes and expanded redistribution” (p. 80). 
Whereas Latin Americaʼs inequality dropped, inequality in most OECD countries was 
on the rise since the 1980s. Different contributing factors altogether have played a 
crucial role in this development. Specifically (as presented on p. 82):
• Globalization
• Technological change (information and communications technology)
• Growth of financial services
• Changing pay norms
• Reduced role of trade unions
• Scaling back of the redistributive tax-and-transfer policy
The most important aspect, with regard to all components mentioned above, is for 
Atkinson to stress that these factors are neither exogenous to the social and economic 
sphere nor beyond our scope of influence. In addition, what history teaches us is that 
income inequality depends not only on macroeconomic factors. Andrea Brandolini calls 
this the “entitlement rule” certifying that household income also relies on “the mechanism 
regulating the appropriations of the output of the economy” (Brandolini 1992: 5). To put 
it simply: Even if two countries have the same macroeconomic conditions, their degree 
of income inequality may differ because they have different entitlement rules in force.
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3.2.1 Proposals and Ideas
With his fifteen proposals, Atkinson offers a branch of possible actions to tackle 
inequality. In a classic manner, among them some call for progressive taxation and 
social protection. But as he believes that inequality can be reduced only if we also focus 
on inequality before taxes and transfers, consequently he considers the marketplace 
too.
3.2.2 Proposals for the Marketplace
Technological changes play a pivotal role in the macroeconomic distribution as the 
metaphor of the race between the greater capacities of the robot and the productivity 
of workers teaches us. Yet, for many workers, these robots are more than a metaphor; 
rather, they represent a real threat (p. 115). Nevertheless, technological progress did 
not come out of a vacuum. Conscious decisions were taken. The remaining question 
Atkinson formulates is: who takes them? There are several reasons why it should not 
be left to the market economy to decide on its direction of progress. Originally the 
distributional concern has to be placed first, because the question in the future and 
about the winners and losers will be directly linked to the question raised by Laura 
Tyson, Chair of the Council of Economic Advisors under President Clinton: “who owns 
the robots?” (McKinsey roundtable discussion 2014, cited in Atkinson 2015: 116). 
Another problem is the importance attributed to shareholders of the firms which may 
stand against the interests of society. The first proposal addresses the first problem: 
the government can influence the nature of technological change and thus the market 
income in total. The second proposal deals with the second problem: the balance 
which has to be found among all actors forming part of society because nowadays, as 
Atkinson argues, “the balance of power is weighted against consumers and workers” 
(p. 124). One of the reasons that provoked imbalances of economic power toward 
capital-friendly regulations is the decline of trade unions within the last decades. One 
inclusive possibility to counter-balance and resolve this grievance would be a Social 
and Economic Council which should consist of representatives of trade unions, but 
also consider the horizontal axis and questions of gender, generationality and ethnicity.
With the reduction of inequality as a goal, unemployment represents another hurdle 
that has to be taken. Unlike the time period until the 1980s, recent decades are marked 
by high unemployment rates. These times cannot be compared exactly to previous 
ones as the nature of employment has changed – and so should considerations on 
the design of social protection. With industrialization and urbanization up until the 
      trAndeS Working Paper Series No. 6, 2018 | 25
twentieth century came the all-or-nothing (0 or 1) concept of work: either you have a 
job, or you do not. But in the twenty-first century it is not any longer possible to talk 
of the one concept of work only: “Nonstandard work is on the increase” (p. 135). The 
most common nonstandard work is part-time job. A striking fact is that it is a gendered 
phenomenon. Recent figures of the European Commission show that in 2015 a share of 
32.1 percent of women worked part-time – in contrast to 8.9 percent of men (EC 2017). 
Another important question concerns the “involuntary” vs. “voluntary” appearance.21 
Thus, the goal of maximum employment or a certain threshold by governments is not in 
accordance with the times; rather it should be to minimize involuntary unemployment.
In the third proposal, Atkinson wants the government to set a concrete target and to be 
“employer of last resort”. Whether in the US, India, or European countries – experiences 
show the feasibility of public employment within national programs. Furthermore, in his 
view, it is necessary to intervene in the market determination of pay, as a job is not 
always key if it comes to escape poverty and inequality (p. 146). As mentioned before, 
the economic factors of supply and demand leave space to bargain about payment. 
But if people take zero-hour jobs (as in the UK) it is obvious that they do so because 
they have no power in the labor market. A pay policy for minimum wage earners should 
be adopted; and furthermore, principals of a pay code for the top incomes should be 
engaged and fostered too, as the explosion of pay at the top within the last decades 
gives rise to concern.
Without a doubt, the role of capital cannot be omitted if we think about how to reduce 
inequality. Atkinson refers to Piketty when he emphasizes the mechanism which 
governs the distribution of wealth, regarding the two factors which are the rate of return 
on capital r and the rate of growth g. He identifies a number of mechanisms operating 
through factor g where according to him no policy proposals can be made22 and thus 
turns to factor r in order to formulate proposals in this field. It is of vital importance to 
recognize that “(t)he return on capital (…) is not the same as the return to individual 
households in the form of investment income” (p. 161). Small savers rely on financial 
services when they are willing to invest in financial assets and pensions. The difference 
between the rate of return on capital and the rate that savers receive is skimmed off 
21 Whereas Central European countries embrace this concept widely and have higher numbers of 
part-time workers in general, it remains uncommon in Central and Eastern Europe; while Southern 
European countries suffer from a rising trend of part-time work in which more than half reported that 
they were working part-time involuntarily (Greece 72.9%, Cyprus 69.4%, Italy 65.65%, Spain 63.7%) 
(EC 2017).
22 Like the tendency of richer families to have less children than working families so that the distribution 
of property gets more concentrated over time; another trend that has been strong since 1980 and 
that further boosts intergenerational transmission of economic status is the so called “assortative 
mating”: when wealthy people tend to marry other wealthy people.
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by the financial services sector and explains to a large extent the wedge between 
the two. The problem is that these high interest rates charged on certain forms of 
lending put enormous pressure on the less wealthy. For nearly all owner-occupiers (99 
percent), houses represent the most valued asset they possess. But little has been 
done to ease the access to lending for householders – which potentially entails serious 
distributional consequences.23 Again, we note that market competition did not bring a 
balanced outcome (with small savers being disadvantaged). A direct route against this 
predicament is presented in his Proposal 5 – an idea on which the Social and Economic 
Council should elaborate. The next proposal offers an idea as how to level the playing 
field so that everyone can be ranked among the small savers: an inheritance for all. 
As Atkinson notes, “Inheritance is typically seen as one of the mechanisms by which 
the wealthy are able to preserve their position at the top of the distribution, but there 
is nothing intrinsically wrong with inheritance. The problem is that inheritance is highly 
unequal” (p. 170).
To sum up, every citizen reaching adulthood would, according to her years she lives in 
a state, receive an inheritance that could be financed by an increased inheritance tax. 
Within the category of inheritance – though not on the individual but on the national 
level – falls the concept of Sovereign Wealth Funds. SWFs would generate additional 
revenue and enable the government to establish more intergenerational equity 
due to investments guided by sensitivity toward ethical criteria (considering social 
responsibility, infrastructure and climate change) and also in order to give an answer 
to the question of who own the robots: “the answer should be that, in part, they belong 
to us all” (p. 174).
3.2.3 Classic: Proposals for Progressive Taxation and Social Protection
From the time after the world wars until 1980, progressive structures set the norm of 
taxation systems. The turning point was reached with the “politics of retrenchment” 
of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan (Pierson 1995). In the extreme cases of 
the UK and US, top income tax rates have been halved; in the UK from 83 percent 
in 1979 to 40 percent in 1988; meanwhile in the US the top rate dropped from 70 
to 35 percent. Atkinson advocates a return of higher rates than the present ones. In 
the first place he clarifies that the number 40 percent as an absolute maximum for a 
top rate which dominates the public debate is not cast in stone. Beyond arithmetic, 
what should be introduced into reflections on this issue is the “concept of fairness” 
23 Furthermore, as James Meades emphasizes, “the rate of return on property is much lower for small 
properties than for large properties” (Meades 2015, cited in Atkinson 2015:.167).
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(p. 187). In the case of the UK, Atkinson discusses and considers a top rate of 65 per 
cent as fair. Furthermore, as inheritance has proven to be an important factor and 
gifts inter vivos increasingly fulfill the same intention, they should not be exempted 
from the progressive rate structure. The eleventh proposal is addressed towards all 
countries that do not have a proportional tax on property – as it is the case for the 
UK. Complementary to the preceding proposals, some “ideas to pursue” broaden 
the spectrum of equalizing mechanisms. One idea consists of a re-examination of an 
annual wealth tax.24 Another idea refers to an “ideal tool” to reduce inequality which 
Piketty introduces in his penultimate chapter in C21, a global tax on capital, which 
Piketty himself calls “utopian”. So what Atkinson does then is to take a step back and 
think of preconditions which would make the utopian idea more realistic. An imaginable 
step would be the creation of a World Tax Administration which could start by creating 
“a global tax regime for taxpayers” (p. 204). Last but not least, he wants multinational 
corporations to contribute to the public finances as they rely on and benefit from the 
infrastructure provided where they operate.
The mechanisms Atkinson presents would generate additional tax revenue. What 
can be done with it? In Atkinsonʼs opinion it is of utmost importance “to finance an 
expansion of spending on social protection” as “no advanced economy achieved a low 
level of inequality and/or relative income poverty with a low level of social spending” 
(p. 205). For this reason, he demands to increase and reconsider the structure of the 
welfare state. He understands a substantial child benefit as crucial and proposes to 
tax it as income so that all families in society are valued for their family responsibility 
and receive support – and at the same time more is given to those with bigger needs. 
As for adults, Atkinson presents a basic income, also known as citizenʼs income, 
in a modified form based not on citizenship but on the principle of participation: the 
Participation Income (PI). “Participation” would be understood as the notion of a social 
contribution, as he agrees with John Rawls, that “those who surf all day off Malibu must 
find a way to support themselves and would not be entitled to public funds” (p. 221). 
These proposals have so far been discussed and to some degree have been put into 
force on a national level. But Atkinson believes them to be adequate for the European 
level with a Europe-wide salient reduction in child poverty as a first goal – “breaking 
new ground” for further ones. The principle alternative to the PI would be a renewal 
and reinvigoration of social insurance and should, first, not fall short of the amount they 
reached until the early 1980s, and second, adopt to the changed labor market of the 
twenty-first century. For the final piece of his set of fifteen proposals, Atkinson turns to 
24  Its implementation could be more favorable than in the past as the level of income inequality and the 
ratio of personal wealth to gross domestic product are higher than the last time when the idea was 
considered in the 1970s.
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the question of national responsibilities on a global scale and dedicates his attention to 
the relationship between countries that are rich and poor. In 1970, the United Nations 
General Assembly agreed upon the target of 0.7 percent of Gross National Income 
(GNI) for the Official Development Assistance (ODA) for the least developed countries.25 
According to Atkinson the bar should be raised to 1 percent. Arguing intrinsically, the 
ODA means a contribution of the rich by 1 percent of their income to the poor – it is 
an ethical question. Instrumentally, we can and should add national arguments, as 
altruism in itself “wonʼt get us far enough” (Jim Murphy 2014, cited in Atkinson 2014: 
234). A lower pressure of migration to OECD countries, increased political stability and 
a reduced risk of terrorist attacks are thus strong arguments. These fifteen proposals 
represent not a tightly tied package, but interdependencies between them exist and if 
progress should be made, “we cannot rely on a sole approach” (p. 239).
3.2.4 Can It Be Done?
The third part of Atkinsonʼs book addresses the criticism of those who take these 
proposals seriously but doubt the feasibility in terms of economic efficiency or in times 
of a globalized economy. In a first step, Atkinson questions whether the cake has to 
shrink – a common economic metaphor.26 Every single equality-enhancing intervention 
must be examined in the individual case. For now, what can be said is that, “there is no 
smoking gun. It is possible that some of the proposed measures to reduce inequality 
will have negative effects on the size of the cake – that cannot be ruled out. But there is 
no general presumption that this will happen, or that the rate of growth will be harmed” 
(p. 262).
On the question on the concerns about whether globalization prevents action, Atkinson 
clearly answers in the negative. As control remains on the national level, it is very much 
up to policy-makers whether less inequality will be achieved. “The impact on the extent 
of inequality depends on domestic policy, and this is one of the reasons we have seen 
larger increases of inequality in some countries than in others, even though they are 
faced with similar external challenges” (p. 280).
25  In fact, far less has been achieved than this – and for decades the numbers have been falling 
steadily. With the Millennium Development Goals from 2002, an upswing of bigger efforts to reach 
the target could have been observed. By 2015, six countries hit the 0.7 percent UN aid spending 
target: UK, Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Sweden; Germany reached the 0.7 
percent goal for the first time in 2016.
26  Even ranked among “The seven best metaphors for the economy”, BBC 2014.
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It is important to emphasize that Atkinson has written this book in a positive spirit (p. 
308) and this, without doubt, is a lesson in itself: that however great the challenge 
to reduce inequality is, it is indispensable to prepare the ground for optimism as the 
solutions to the problem lie in our hands. But what would it cost? The result of his 
calculations for the UK of all measures taken together is that the set of proposals 
is revenue-neutral to current policies (p. 294).27 In conclusion: the proposals would 
enable a revenue-neutral policy-change which would promote a salient reduction of 
the Gini-coefficient, over-all poverty, and child poverty.
3.3 Milanovic: Round and Round It Goes
Milanovicʼs greatest merit lies in the analysis of inequality on a global level, consisting of 
inequality among as well as within countries. Beyond that he stimulates the theoretical 
debate on inequality by introducing the “Kuznets cycle” or “waves”. With the extension 
of the “Kuznets curve” that was established more than half a century ago, he provides, 
as the subtitle suggests, “a new approach for the age of globalization”.
3.3.1 The Rise of the Global Middle Class and Global Plutocrats
Milanovic opens his book straight away with the question who the winners of 
globalization are. As time frame he sets the period from 1988 to 2008, choosing this 
starting point in part because of available data from then on, but also because the 
interdependent world economy expanded in a considerable manner.28 To illustrate the 
answer, he presents what is known as the “elephant curve”29 (shown in Figure 4) with 
relative gains in income per person by worldwide income level for the time of the 
“high globalization” and identifies three points of interest where growth was either the 
highest or lowest. Group A can be identified as the one with the highest growth rate. 
People belonging to this group around the median (constituting the middle value in an 
ordered distribution) gained some 75 percent. In nine out of ten cases they originate 
from the emerging countries of Asia like China, India, Thailand, Vietnam and Indonesia 
(Milanovic 2016: 19). Not only on a global level but also within their own countries, 
this group represents the median and can be termed “emerging global middle class”. 
Group B is richer than A, as they are to the right on the axis. In sharp contrast to A, no 
27  All measures combined could achieve a 5.5 percentage point reduction of the Gini coefficient, 
bringing the UK from 32.1 (in 2015) to 26.6. Furthermore, the poverty rate could be reduced from 
16.0 to 10.4 percent; and child poverty would decline from 16.8 percent to 12.1 percent.
28  One thinks of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union, economic reforms in India and China 
and in addition, the “communication revolution”.
29  Selected by Paul Krugman as the chart of the year 2015 (Krugman 2015).
30 | Linartas - Inequality in the Twenty-First Century: A Review on Rockstars of the Realm
growth in real income during the twenty-year period took place. This group consists 
of people from the rich economies of the OECD countries. Mostly they belong to the 
lower half of these countries. 
Figure 4: The Elephant Curve
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Source: Own elaboration, based on Milanovic 2016: 11. Relative gains in real per capita income by 
global income level from 1988 to 2008.
They may be titled “lower middle class of the rich world”. Group C is made up of the 
global 1 percent. This group has experienced a very strong growth over the last twenty 
years from 1988 to 2008. The bulk of this group is from the rich economies and may be 
called “global plutocrats”.30 But how was the development after the “high globalization”, 
following the Financial Crisis of 2008? This crisis worked in favor to rebalance the 
economies of Asia. If we take a look on the relative gain of the median (Group A) for the 
time-period of 1988 to 2011, instead of 75 percent, we find tremendous gains of nearly 
120 percent. For Group B we find little change. Group C seems to have lost in terms 
of relative gain in real per capita income. This weakening of the Global Top 1 Percent 
might seem bizarre, more so as it flies in the face of popular and current concern on 
30 A look at absolute gains in contrast to relative gains changes this perception: 44 percent of the 
absolute gains passed into the hands of the top 5 percent. At the same time, the “emerging global 
middle class” received some 2 to 4 percent. But this, in Milanovicʼs opinion, should not revise the 
previous conclusion, as there has been a major economic success in Asia and relative gains are the 
ones that are firstly considered by the people affected (p. 28).
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inequality. But the reason for this stems from the highly concentrated growth at the 
very top among the super-rich. Numbers from the Forbes list (and data from the Credit 
Suisse Institute) permit him to conclude that during globalization, the share of the hyper-
wealthy expressed in terms of world gross domestic product (GDP) has more than 
doubled from nearly 3 percent in 1987 to more than 6 percent in 2013.31 This growth 
of the hyper-wealthy in addition to the growth of the emerging global middle class are 
the two most significant developments since the beginning of high globalization in the 
late 1980s (p. 45).
3.3.2 Inequality within Countries
Before Milanovic turns to analyze inequality within countries, he develops the 
methodology and introduces the “Kuznets Waves” to explain long-term trends in 
inequality. As Milanovic identifies shortcomings of previous hypotheses, his objective 
is to formulate an extension of the Kuznets curve in such a way that we finally have a 
coherent approach which is also applicable for the time before the Industrial Revolution 
(according to Milanovic, a shortcoming of Piketty), the “Inequality Turn” in the era of 
Reagan and Thatcher (shortcoming of Kuznets) and up to the present day.
The Industrial Revolutionsʼ peculiarity lies in two developments: first, it was the 
initiation of a relationship between the level of inequality and the mean income. And 
second, we can observe a rise in the latter. This “surplus” over the subsistence level 
shifts the “inequality possibility frontier”; or to put it differently, it leaves more space 
for more inequality (p. 52).32 Independent of the time horizon, when explaining the 
wax and wane of inequality, Milanovic distinguishes between “benign” and “malign” 
mechanisms – the benign “resulting from economic and demographic forces”, the 
malign “consisting of wars and revolutions” (p. 53). The combined appearance of both 
helps to explain the paramount inequality reduction during the world war period up until 
the 1980s, when “the forces that drove inequality down after World War I had come 
to an end”. This end marks a caesura; and in Milanovicʼs opinion, it is appropriate to 
directly compare this revolution in technology with the Industrial Revolution as both 
widened the income disparities. In his view, it is the crucial changes that came by the 
technological innovations that are responsible for the inequality turn.
31 Milanovic fixed the wealth line in real terms, using the US Consumer Price Index: $1 billion in 1987 is 
equivalent to $2 billion in 2013. These super-rich he calls “(f)or simplicityʼs sake” the hyper-wealthy.
32 Important to keep in mind: “The frontier is concave: maximum feasible inequality increases with 
mean income but at a decreasing rate” (p. 52).
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Figure 5: Inequality Possibility Frontier
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Source: Own elaboration, based on Milanovic 2016: 52. The locus of maximum feasible Gini coefficient 
as a function of mean income level.
“Pro-rich policies” (a form of benign forces) contributed to this trend, but they were 
“inherent in the information revolution”, thus necessary as tax polic es af er Reagan 
and Thatcher, followed by Bill Clinton and Tony Blair, remained the same (p. 55). These 
benign forces are solely found in societies with a rising mean income, thus after the 
Industrial Revolution.33 On the contrary, malign forces are at work in both societies 
with either stagnant or rising mean incomes. They have been the only ones that were 
able to reduce economic inequality in preindustrial societies. More specifically, two 
special forms of malign forces came into play. The first to mention is plague. Plague 
increased real wages as the labor workforce became scarce; in addition, death also 
affected wealthy people resulting in their property becoming more fragmented.34 But 
the consequences have not been the same everywhere: as Mattia Fochesato showed, 
institutions mattered and the extent to which they were able to check wage increases 
varied depending on their strength or weaknesses (Fochesato 2014). The second 
powerful factor was war. Milanovic refers to the explanation offered by Piketty, according 
to which the physical destruction of capital and inflation in times of war resulted in a 
decrease of income received from property (p. 64).
33 Other benign forces are e.g. social pressure through politics such as in form of trade unions, 
widespread education, an aging population which pushes the demand for social protection, and 
technological change that favors low-skilled workers
34  See Pamuk 2007, Álvarez-Nogal and Escosura 2011.
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What was it that pushed inequality in preindustrial societies up “when mean income 
stays more or less constant?” (p. 65). The answer is: the moment when mean income 
rises – even if it is just for a short moment, as it shifts the inequality possibility frontier 
(like has been explained above). This possibility (note: not necessity) makes the main 
difference between societies with and without rising mean incomes. The remaining 
question is whether inequality went up as the mean income rose. According to the 
Kuznets curve hypothesis, the reason for the inequality changes lies within a structural 
movement from the agricultural sector with low income (and low inequality) to the 
industrial sector with higher income (and higher inequality). The hypothesis is in 
accordance with the findings for most cases until the 1980s.35 It cannot explain the 
upswing in inequality since then. Here the Kuznets circles or waves and the second 
technological revolution come into play. By the following statements Milanovic offers 
an insight into his meta-theoretical approach: in the second Kuznets wave, economic, 
political and social forces all together are at work. In his opinion, it would be absolutely 
naïve to look only at the economic factors of supply and demand in order to explain 
the movement of the Kuznets waves. But to look solely at institutions would be also 
misleading as “institutions and policies work within what economics allows: they are, if 
one wishes to use this term, “endogenous”, that is, largely dependent on income level, 
and they can only vary within what income permits” (p. 73).
It should be clear that these assumptions build the basis of the hypothesis of the 
Kuznets waves.36 According to his approach, three forces were responsible for the 
evolution of inequality: technology, openness (or globalization), and policy (or politics), 
which may be grouped together under the acronym TOP (p. 76). In the brief, Milanovic 
concludes his analyses of different case studies as follows:
As is nicely illustrated in Europe and the United States for the period after the 
Great Depression and World War II, the strength of trade unions, the political 
power of socialist and communist parties, and the example and military threat of 
the Soviet Union all curbed pro-rich policies by constraining the power of capital. 
But once these political limitations weakened or disappeared and economic 
factors became more favorable to capital (…) the situation reversed, and the 
second Kuznets wave, which is still in force (p. 87).
35  Milanovic searches for the answer in by analyzing the US, the UK, Spain, Italy, Germany, Netherlands, 
Brazil, Chile, and Japan.
36  Milanovicʼs approach can be identified at an earlier stage when he speaks of economic necessities. 
This thought dismantles the same beliefs. It is exactly this debate about which opinions – or in 
scientifically adequate term, different epistemological approaches – differ.
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But what were the reasons behind the inequality decline in the twentieth century? 
Milanovic names two different approaches before he offers a third and his own: the 
“traditional” and economic one, supported by Kuznets who identified economic forces 
(that enable a structural transformation) and neglected the role of war; and Pikettyʼs 
approach which is political in the first place. Not only did the two world wars destroy 
property and reduced large fortunes, but pro-labor-legislations came into force which 
Piketty presents as exogenous events, “that is as political elements outside economics 
proper” (p. 94). As we have seen before, this contradicts the assumptions of Milanovic 
who offers a third and new reading of the story how inequality declined. To ground his 
telling, he introduces the interpretation of the outbreak of World War I and integrates 
it into the framework of the Kuznets waves. In brief: in the theoretical argument set 
by Hobson, Marx, Luxemburg, and Lenin, colonialism and domestic maldistribution of 
income are linked and identified as the causes for the first world war. The benign forces 
which came later into play (such as high taxation and trade unions) were of crucial 
importance and Milanovic recognizes the role of ideology and economic elements 
which between 1950 and 1980 contributed to a downswing in inequality. However, 
these benign economic policies were the result of war. Yet in the first place the world 
wars itself have to be understood as the result of income inequality. Thus, the answer 
to the question, what was the reasoning behind the decline in inequality in the twentieth 
century was, to ‘get to the point’, inequality itself.
Turning to the upward portion of the Kuznets wave in the 1980s, and comprehending its 
course, it is important to understand several factors that participated in this development: 
while the wage inequality went up (as the labor moved from manufacturing to service 
sector), trade union density went down (as the organization of workers is more difficult 
and less relevant, due to the fact that the service sector has a higher dispersal of labor 
and units of smaller size at the same time). This downswing in addition to a huge 
increase in available labor and capitalʼs capacity to cross borders in search of lower 
taxes has weakened the bargaining power of workers (versus capital: 106). Furthermore, 
Milanovic points at Pikettyʼs C21 who draws special attention to the role of capital 
income; a lower progressive taxation and lower taxes on capital also contributed to 
this trend. Even where the welfare state kept its social transfers high, it was not able to 
balance growing market income inequality. In addition to these factors, other concerns 
exist, namely assortative mating (when wealthy people tend to marry wealthy people) 
and changes in pay norms (which enable gaps between top managers). However, the 
two most important and underlying explanations Milanovic identifies are technological 
change and globalization, “wrapped around each other” (p. 110). If, as stated before, 
policy is seen as endogenous to globalization, this means that all three elements of 
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TOP (technology, openness or globalization, and policy) have to be seen as mutually 
dependent.
3.3.3 Inequality among Countries
The shift of focus from inequality within countries to inequality among countries has 
been quite a new endeavor, owing not least to missing data which have now become 
available.
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Source: Own elaboration based on Milanovic 2016: 129, slightly different as the B-M series does not 
drop here. The B-M series is from Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002), the L-M and M series is from 
Lakner and Milanovic (2013) and Milanovic (2016).
What we can see is an ongoing growth of global inequality throughout the nineteenth 
century. While European Countries, North America and Australia showed a sharp 
rise during the Industrial Revolution, or as Milanovic names it, the first technological 
revolution, other countriesʼ Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita level, like China 
and India, stagnated or even declined. According to Figure 6, inequality among and, 
as was shown before, inequality within countries, was on an unprecedented rise. But 
what we can interpret with caution is that global inequality became stable or even 
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declined at the beginning of the twenty first century. What this data and the Theil index 
(another index to measure inequality) allow to ask: what type of inequality prevails, the 
inequality within a country, which can be named “class-based inequality”, or inequality 
between individuals from different countries, thus a “location-based inequality”?37 
While at the beginning of the nineteenth century 80 percent of global inequality was 
explained by inequality within countries, 150 years later the proportions reversed. By 
1970, around 20 percent of within country inequality and 80 percent of among country 
inequality accounted for the overall global inequality. As can be seen, while once the 
class mattered and a family in which one was born into, nowadays the question of 
location, thus where someone was born, has more influence on oneʼs lifetime income. 
Or as Milanovic notes, “The contrast drawn by Frantz Fanon [1925-1961] between the 
colonizers and colonized represents that type of world best – as opposed to the world 
with which Marx [1818-1883] dealt (…) which was the world of class” (p. 129)”.
As the recent trend shows, a renewed reversal of “local” and “class” inequality is 
conceivable. But for the moment, the country where people live, or the “citizenship 
premium”38 explains more than two-thirds of the variability of incomes across countries. 
Hence the concept of equality of opportunity is not applicable on the global level. 
This may be understood by an argument which Simon Caney presents, following 
the implicitly “domain restriction” developed by John Rawls: civil and political rights 
as well as distributive justice are thought and understood in the national context but 
are not applicable to the international realm (Caney 2002). Milanovic discusses this 
contradiction within the concept of globalization which enables production, technology, 
capital and ideas to spread and move across borders – with the exception of labor. 
As he tries to reconcile migration with the unwillingness to open borders, he does so 
in normative terms but also from an economic perspective and concludes that we are 
confronted with three possible options, which I would like to quote:
1. Allow unrestricted movement of labor and enforce nondiscrimination between 
domestic and foreign labor in all countries [a concept that, at present, seems 
unattainable].
37 The Theil index allows “to decompose inequality into the part that is due to inequality within areas 
(e.g. urban, rural) and the part that is due to differences between areas” (World Bank 2005: 95). This 
means that it has the advantage that, in contrast to the Gini index, it is fully decomposable which, 
simply put, makes it “possible for [Theil] to register an increase in inequality in every subgroup of the 
population at the same time as a decrease in inequality overall” (Cowell 2009: 64).
38  The average rent or premium calculated across all citizens and “country against country” (p. 133).
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2. Allow for a limited but higher level of migration than what currently exists, 
with legally defined relatively mild differences in treatment of local and foreign 
labor [which would make it necessary to outpace the current definition of 
citizenship and migration policy].
3. Keep the flow of migrants at the current level or an even lower level and 
maintain the fiction of equal treatment of all residents while allowing for de 
facto differential treatment of the “illegals” (p. 154).     
    
3.3.4 Global Inequality in this Century and the Next
As Milanovic tries to take a look on the evolution of inequality in following decades, he 
states that the main economic theories which shape the thinking on global inequality 
at present and for the future are ‘Economic Convergence’ and ‘Kuznets Waves’ which 
cover both sides of the equation: inequality among and inequality within nations.39 
According to the first, globalization gives less developed countries access to technology 
and knowledge on economic policies from developed states (which did not have this 
advantage in past) so that poor countries should experience growth rates of income 
that exceed the rates of the rich countries. As the data reveal, up until the 1980s this 
was not the case. Yet for the last thirty-five years, both higher growth rates in relation 
to advanced economies and lower Gini coefficients of emerging countries show the 
trend of income convergence. Coming to the other side of the equation – inequality 
within nations – Milanovic chooses China and the US as prime examples because 
of both their size and their different economic levels, belonging to emerging and rich 
economies. Figure 7 presents a stylized estimate of the current position of China and 
the United States in the first and second Kuznets waves.
Following the analysis of data and literature on China, he expresses his optimistic view 
that China may have reached its income inequality peak.40 But forces, like pervasive 
corruption, could push income inequality further. In contrast to China, the near future of 
the US seems to give no space for optimism. Various developments together may lead 
to, as Milanovic calls it, a “perfect storm of inequality” (Milanovic 2016: 180). Some 
39 The first envisages the matter of differences among nations as it states that globalization should 
entail an overall income convergence. The latter looks on individual states, their income level and 
structural features, as to identify their position along the Kuznets waves.
40 His prediction is supported by different theoretical approaches; in the first place it would be perfectly 
in line with the Kuznetsʼs hypothesis (and the structural transformation from socialism to capitalism) 
and also with Tinbergen (who assumes that the relative wages of highly skilled workers should be 
reduced as the supply of more educated labor expands).
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developments not only tend to let inequality rise, but compromise the foundations of 
democracy likewise the irrefutable fact of the growing importance of money in electoral 
politics: “The political importance of each individual becomes equivalent to his or her 
income level, and instead of a one-person one-vote system, we approach a system of 
one-dollar one-vote (…) A plutocracy is thus born” (p. 190).
Figure 7: Kuznets Waves for the United States and China
Source: cf. Milanovic 2016: 191; own compilation.
Some consequences of the developments are clearly reflected in numbers likewise the 
decline in the share of the middle-class population since the 1980s. The main problem 
of this development is that it is the middle-class which allows for both democracy and 
stability (p. 194). In the US it appears that democracy is still in place since freedom 
of speech, right of association, and free elections are maintained. But the scheme 
gets increasingly similar to a plutocracy (p. 199). Milanovic identifies two forms of 
suppression by the rich on the middle and the poor class. One way is through the 
suppression of the vote of the poor. The second suppression consists of the creation 
of a false consciousness of the middle and lower class, to use the terminology of Marx. 
With this concept Milanovic wishes to express that this group is distracted from their 
economic interests while their attention is brought to other issues of societal or religious 
nature – mostly deeply divisive. This means that “the culture war has a function, and 
that function is to mask the real shift of economic power toward the rich” (p. 202). In 
addition, this suppression is perverted and underpinned by the persisting overestimation 
of the poor people in regard to social mobility that makes them believe that everyone 
is the architect of his or her own fortune. This ideology arises from the American two-
party-system and points to a deeply rooted problem. In contrast to the developments 
in the US, Europe faces other challenges as its systems are multiparty (and thus not 
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prone to plutocracy) and tools to manage migration movements are missing. Because 
of these two factors, globalization exerts pressure in two forms: first, in form of ongoing 
migration and second, through the movement of goods (imports) and capital (outflow) 
which in turn burdens the welfare state. When it comes to the welfare state, a common 
belief prevails that the poor (and migrants) are the main beneficiaries of it. But this is 
false and furthermore a threat to the stabilizers of democracy and stability:
The numerous attacks on the welfare state (…) are in reality attacks on the 
middle class (…) the middle class gain even more through free or subsidized 
health care and education, pensions, and, more than anything else, through the 
presence of a safety net to catch them were they ever to fall to a lower station 
on life (p. 207).
The reaction to the creeping process of the dismantling of the welfare state protection 
is a higher share of popular vote received by right-wing nationalist or populist parties 
in all Western and Central European countries. These two different types of backlash 
show the trade-off between globalization and democracy. While Europe tries to keep 
the flame of democracy by cushioning effects from globalization, America is willed to 
sacrifice democratic elements in order to further push globalization.
Some additional notes have to be made at this point: when this book was published, 
Donald Trump was not yet elected as the 45th president of the United States. Under the 
presidency of Trump – who is listed in the Forbes List (with an estimated net worth of $3.1 
billion) and his foreign policy of “America first” – both the tendency toward plutocracy 
and a populist and nationalist approach define the political agenda. Meanwhile in 
Europe, the British people voted for Brexit; Germany has for the first time since World 
War II a populist right-wing party in its parliament, forming the largest opposition party; 
and in France, the elected President and independent centrist Emmanuel Macron, a 
former investment banker, competed against National Front Leader Le Pen.41 What in 
2016 sounded like a provocative idea, was caught up by reality. But to which extent the 
outlined scenarios of plutocracy and the rise of populism and nationalism are fulfilled, 
belongs to another debate.
41 In the first round for the presidential election Macron was leading with 23.9 percent while Le Pen was 
close behind with 21.34 percent (CNN 2017).
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3.3.5 What Next?
According to Milanovic, the ‘Economic Convergence’ and the ‘Kuznets waves’ will 
determine the future, while economic growth will be the most powerful tool to reduce 
poverty and inequality. Concerning the rich countries, he dares the prognosis that the 
middle classes will continue to shrink and that in times of “new capitalism” success will 
depend much more on family background and luck than this has been the case in the 
last decades. Meanwhile we are observing that globalization leads to a dismantling of 
the welfare state. Here it is the governments of rich countries that play a crucial role 
as they should ensure a more equal market income, or in other words: the objective 
should be to tackle inequality already before taxes. More so as globalization challenges 
the rising scalability of jobs. This means that the difference between jobs in that a 
service or product can be offered once (like a taxi drive) and one that can be spread 
(like music or lessons from professors) becomes bigger as more and more people can 
enjoy and pay the respective fees. Much as music and lessons may be indulged to 
everyone interested, this entails further rising gaps of income between the ones that 
can reach more people via the world wide web and the ones that cannot. All these 
developments and tendencies make clear that there is a further need to focus not 
exclusively on the horizontal axis of inequality and nations as it has mostly been in the 
past. But it is necessary to devote more attention to the vertical dimension and global 
affairs as the peoplesʼ life and circumstances are not conceivable as solely determined 
within national borders. This book proves that methodological advances in economics 
made it possible to do exactly this. And one certain finding can already be given: that 
inequality will not disappear as globalization continues (p. 239).
3.4 Scheidel: The Moral of that (Hi)story
For his overarching framework, Scheidel picks up the visual language of the Christian 
apocalyptic vision of the Four Horsemen; with the difference, that he assigns them 
other roles, namely war, revolution, collapse, and plague.42 According to his analysis, 
throughout the history of the last millennia, civilization was not able to conquer economic 
inequality which in periods without violent shocks was able to expand continuously. 
This argument is at the core of his thesis: massive violent shocks only have had been 
able to let economic inequality shrink. The appearance of their destructive power is a 
necessary (if not sufficient) prerequisite. When asked about other levelers of peaceful 
character, Scheidel negates their very existence. Before he presents “alternatives” in 
the form of other approaches and theories (e.g. democracy, economic development 
42 Instead of the usual attribution of death, famine, war, and conquest.
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or the interplay of education and technology) – just to unmask their weakness against 
the uprising inequality – he leads us through plenty of recorded history and several 
continents along the most violent disasters that humanity has ever experienced.43
In order to value his work, it is important to understand what the book is about, and “what 
this book is not about”. First, Scheidel focuses on the material inequality within, but not 
between societies. Second, he is interested in violent shocks and thereby in identifying 
the mechanisms of leveling, but not vice versa how inequality may have impacted 
violence. For his analysis he relies mostly on the Gini coefficient and top income shares.44 
Besides these common ways of measuring inequality, he calls archeology, proxy data 
(e.g. ratio of land rents to wages), historian records of contemporary observers, and 
molecular biology also his repertoire. To measure inequality in premodern societies, 
one has to follow an eclectic approach. Equipped with a wide range of tools he is able 
and willing to do so. The reason why Scheidel wants to offer a historical background of 
the evolution of material inequality is that policy proposals which intend to tackle this 
issue often lack awareness of recorded history. In his “Brief History of Inequality” he 
finds that three factors may explain inequality and its persistence: firstly, “the relative 
importance of different classes of assets (e.g. material wealth)”, secondly, “how suitable 
they are for passing on to others (reliance on defensible natural resources)”, and thirdly, 
by “actual rates of transmission (from one generation to the next)” (Scheidel 2017: 
38). In 6000 to 4000 BCE, these “structural ingredients” were already put in place, 
thus they were given a long time before the state formation had its beginning. But 
once governmental institutions were established, material and political inequality went 
hand in hand, exacerbating each other’s existence in an “upward spiral of interactive 
effects”. One anecdote from the Roman Empire delineates (even if exaggerating) the 
severe dimension that inequality reached at the beginning of our western calculation of 
time: “Imperial unification and connectivity facilitated the expansion and concentration 
of personal wealth. Under Nero, six men were said to have owned “half” of the province 
of Africa” (p. 75).
Over time, economic and urban growth fueled the increase of inequality. 
Commercialization and a growing wage dispersion also provided a partial explanation. 
These disequalizers boosted inequality in different composed complementarities, 
“determined by local economic and institutional conditions” (p. 100), but all over Europe 
43 342 pages filled with good mood and optimism.
44 But he draws “attention to their limitations where appropriate” (p.13). To name the most important 
weaknesses: The Gini index usually derives from household surveys, top income shares from tax 
records and whereas the former does not capture the very large incomes, the latter suffers from 
comparability over time and space and is skewed due to tax evasion.
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they did so whenever no violent shock occurred. Beyond Europe, the same may be 
assumed for Asia and Latin America. By the nineteenth century, all parts of the globe 
regardless of region, political system, and level of industrialization, show the same 
pattern of high inequality.
Technological progress, economic development, the widening globalization of 
the flows of goods and capital, and the ongoing strengthening of states, coupled 
with a century of unusually peaceful conditions, created an environment that 
protected private property and benefited capital investors (p. 111).
3.4.1 War
In the twentieth century, the above quoted environment was totally destroyed when 
two out of four Horsemen came across and raged for decades. Accurately, “total war 
was the single ultimate cause” (p. 117) but had a faithful companion – namely the 
transformative-communist-revolution – which followed his forerunner close behind. 
In developed countries all over the world, both main belligerents (such as the US 
and France) and nonbelligerents (as Switzerland and Sweden), experienced a huge 
deconcentration of income and wealth during “the drama of the thirty years war” (Charles 
de Gaulle 1946)45 from 1914 to 1945. Various statistics show a common ground: the 
rate of decline of the top income shares was always bigger during war time than in the 
postwar period; and World War II revealed a bigger leveling effect than World War I. As 
ratios of private wealth to national income clearly demonstrate, the loss of the elite was 
not redistributed on behalf of the rest of the population but indeed wiped out (p. 140). 
Scheidel shares Pikettyʼs opinion in that it was due to losses in nonwage income that 
the Top 1 percent has suffered its tremendous reduction – brought about by combat, 
bankruptcies, rent control, nationalization, and inflation in the years of 1914 to 1945 (p. 
147). Not only did the elite lose its gains from capital. A fiscal revolution brought about 
changes in progressive income taxation with very high marginal rates and estate taxes, 
as wartime justified a higher taxation on unearned incomes. All these mechanisms 
were direct or indirect consequences of the experience of war. But caution should be 
exercised when it comes to claim generalized findings. Scheidel accuses Piketty of 
exactly this mistake, when Piketty, based on the experience of France, assumed that 
“in the twentieth century it was war only (…) that erased the past and enabled society 
to begin anew with a clean slate” (Piketty 2014: 275). Between these two approaches 
there is a subtle but important difference. In contrast to Piketty, Scheidel assumes that 
war was necessary and worked as a catalyst. But a state did not have to be involved 
45  Speech at Bar-Le-Duc on July 28, 1946: “Le drame de la guerre de trente ans”.
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and to undergo the chaos of war in order to shape the development of inequality in 
societies.
The case of Sweden is instructive in demonstrating that even a comparatively 
limited war mobilization effect could be sufficient to create the fiscal infrastructure 
as well as the political will and electoral support that were required for progressive 
policy preferences to carry the day (p. 164).
Another important scholar Scheidel cites is Max Weber who understood warfare as a 
force that paved the way for more political rights and thus a “Triumph of Democracy” 
(Weber 1950: 325-326, here Scheidel 2017: 167). The combination of the long-lasting 
process of the recovery of capital which was destroyed to a large extent and the triumph 
of democracy encouraged the promotion of an expectation for higher levels of fairness, 
participation and inclusion. This in turn laid the foundations for the modern welfare 
state, enabled through progressive taxation, unionization (a leveling force which is 
negatively correlated with income inequality) and democratization.
Figure 8: The Triumph of Democracy
Source: Own elaboration. The curve represents the decline of the Top 1% Income Share since WWI 
and WWII.
3.4.2 Revolution
The leveling effect of conflicts between states has been examined. But what about 
internal conflicts that “strive for a more comprehensive restructuring of society”? Only 
a few revolutions exhibited such an extreme level of violence that it is possible to find 
profound changes in the distribution of income and wealth. Again, it is the twentieth 
century which offers the best confirmation of this approach, as the communist 
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revolutions induced the most impressive reduction in inequality with more than 100 
million deaths and low inequality levels comparable to those of the belligerents of the 
world wars. The first of this kind to name is the Russian revolution in the aftermath of 
World War I. “War Communism” under Wladimir Iljitsch Lenin from 1917, characterized 
by a high degree of open state coercion of all kind, a rampant inflation, and more 
than 7 million arrested people in the Gulag prison camps by order of Josef Stalin until 
1924 caused an unprecedented inequality reduction. Yet inequality was on the rise as 
soon as economy was growing again from 1933 onward. After the second world war, 
political interventions as a result of communist ideology caused further lending.46 But 
in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet System, inequality set off at 
high speed and the Gini coefficient doubled in only five years from 0.28 to 0.51 in 1995 
(p. 222).47 Once more the causation for great leveling can be expressed by the simple 
credo: “no violence, no leveling” (p. 223). The Maoist period in China shows particular 
characteristics to the Russian experience.48 Other communist revolutions in North 
Vietnam, North Korea, Cuba and Nicaragua had the same intention – to restructure 
society in a comprehensive way and disestablish upper classes through nationalization 
– exercised violence to a lesser extent and missed any long-lasting inequality descent. 
This finding is also applicable for the French Revolution. No transformation occurred 
as changes in wealth concentration, income distribution and in landownership were on 
a small scale only. To put in plainly in the words of Scheidel: 
(H)owever much it may have scandalized conservative contemporary observers, 
a revolution [that] turned out to be quite restrained in its means and ambitions 
yielded correspondingly less leveling (p. 238).
3.4.3 Collapse
The targets of the third horseman in form of collapse are state hierarchies and extractive 
institutions. Collapse may come in the form of state failure or system collapse. The 
first may be understood as a given when the state loses its capacity to accomplish 
its basic objectives like the control function for internal affairs and the promotion of 
basic security for itself as much as for key allies. System collapse can be defined as 
“rapid, significant loss of an established level of social complexity (…) that goes well 
46 In 1988, more than 96 percent of the workers were employed by the state.
47 Both ends of the social spectrum reached new highs: the top quintile share grew from 44 to 51 
percent until 2013 and the number of the poor accounted for 60 percent by the time of the financial 
crisis in 1998.
48 “By the end of the Maoist period, between 6 million and 10 million Chinese had been killed or driven 
to suicide by the state, and about 50 million others had passed through the laogai camp system, 
where 20 million of them died” (p. 227).
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beyond the failure of political institutions of governance” (pp. 257-258). A state failure 
acts as a catalyst for leveling as the enrichment of the elite is intertwined with political 
stability. If a state was not able to guarantee stable structures, the holding of wealth 
and income were put under threat and expansion was proved to be more challenging. 
The onset of instability was shaking existing income streams of the elite to the core 
and was able to lower inequality simply because the rich had more to lose than the 
poor. The difference between this event and a system collapse lies in the scale of 
impoverishment, as the height of fall for the rich appeared to be even larger. One of the 
best-documented premodern case studies is the Tang dynasty in China, established 
in 618 CE. The downfall of the Western half of the Roman Empire represents another 
case of leveling due to a state collapse (sic!) in the early seventh century. Considering 
that not only senatorial families were rubbed-out (in a literal meaning: no names appear 
in any historical records) but regional and sub-regional elites likewise disappeared, it 
is to question whether the losses of the top may have been transformed into gains for 
the bottom. To find an answer, Scheidel refers to a Stanford dissertation by Robert 
Stephan from 2013, who studied the house sizes of the Roman world.49 And indeed, 
his findings allow for an approximation of a Gini coefficient and to assess that the 
failure of the Empire had a considerable leveling effect – which in turn reveals that 
not only the elite were pressed down but that the poor were lifted up. Other cases of 
such demise like the Mayan and Aztecan societies, the old kingdom period in Egypt 
and Akkadian empire in Mesopotamia still remain a riddle. But it is possible to analyze 
a contemporary case that “may at least come close” (p. 283) to state failure: Somalia. 
The time period from 1991 to 2006 can be understood as a period in which Somalia 
was a de facto failed state.50 The few available data leave no room for doubt that 
until the present time it is in a bad shape.51 The question is whether the experienced 
state failure changed the distribution of income and wealth. The disappearance of the 
elite “that greatly benefitted from rent extraction” at the expanse of the rural Somali 
population allow for the assumption that state collapse entailed to level inequality.
In some cases of collapse, the entire population was worse off (but the richer to a 
higher extent). In other cases, like in Somalia, it was mostly the elite that became 
affected. Yet no matter to which extent the leveling took place, the underlying finding 
is that a collapse of state hierarchies and extractive institutions enables the reduction 
of inequality.
49 “House size represents an acceptable proxy for per capita economic well-being: household income 
and residential house size are strongly correlated across cultures” (p. 267).
50  From the overthrow of the regime of Mohamed Siad Barre until the Ethiopian interaction fifteen years 
later.
51 Data are available in form of the multidimensional poverty index and numbers of severe poverty; it is 
not possible to calculate the Human Development Index as data are missing.
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3.4.4 Plague
The Fourth Horseman completes the quartet. To give an understanding how epidemic 
and pandemic diseases were able to reduce inequality, Scheidel refers to An Essay 
on the Principle of Population by Reverend Thomas Malthus from 1798. According 
to Malthus, in the long-term, population tends to grow faster than resources. But 
this “triggers” checks, namely “preventive checks” that lower fertility rate (by moral 
restraints) and “positive checks” that raise mortality. Epidemic and pandemic diseases 
belong to positive checks “which in any degree contribute to shorten the natural 
duration of human life” (Malthus 1992 [1798]: 23). These “positive checks” did not 
become effective within the last 150 years, but in premodern societies they burst with 
enormous force. Their leveling effect came by the changed land to work ratio which 
lowered the value of the former and caused the price of the latter to rise. An important 
precondition for this mechanism was an effective price-setting market: “Microbes and 
markets had to operate in tandem to compress inequality” (p. 292). But as soon as 
the population recovered and grew again, so did inequality as the pressure on the 
land-labor ratio decreased. The “Black Death” provides a good example: the most 
recent estimates for Europe range between a death toll of 25 percent to 45 percent 
of the entire population, shrinking from 94 million in 1300 to 68 million in 1400.52 To 
prove the underlying leveling logic of plague, Scheidel interprets historical accounts 
and laws (as the sumptuary laws in England which in 1337 allowed nobles and clerics 
only to wear furs; by 1363 it was permitted to everyone) and furthermore, he searches 
for quantitative evidence, as offered by Guidio Alfani who gathered and analyzed data 
from archives in Piemont (Italy) from the fourteenth until the nineteenth century. His 
data reveal a decreasing share of the Top 5 percent of society whose share in 1300 
accounted for more than 45 percent and went down to 33 percent in 1450, before it 
returned to previous highs in 1650.53 The Americas also suffered from the appearance 
of the Fourth Horseman, brought in from the Old to the New World in various forms 
such as smallpox, measles, influenza to name a few. The demographic change is 
estimated to be impacted by a loss of half the population.54 The Justinianic Plague 
(541 to 750 CE) and Antonine Plague (165 to 180 CE) are further examples for the 
appearance of the Fourth Horseman and relying on historical accounts, molecular 
52 A contemporary witness of the plague in Florence, Giovanni Boccaccio, describes that “such was 
the multitude of corpses… that there was not sufficient consecrated ground for them to be buried in” 
(Horrox 1994: 33, cited in Scheidel 2017: 296).
53 The Gini coefficient has the similar curve progression, starting at 0.45 in 1300, decreasing to 0.32 in 
1450 and getting back to its old level in 1650 (p. 307).
54 Bernardino de Sahagún, a missionary priest from Spain and Aztec archeologist, wrote about the 
Aztec capital Tenochtitlan that “the streets were so filled with dead and sick people that our men 
walked over nothing but bodies” (Cook 1998: 202, cited in Scheidel 2017: 315).
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biology, papyrological land and tax lists, calculations of infection and mortality rate, and 
changes in real prices and rents, Scheidel confirms his findings.
3.4.5 Alternatives
As Scheidel finds that, “(t)o a great extent, the scale of leveling used to be a function 
of the scale of violence: the more force was expended, the more leveling occurred” 
(p. 345), he questions first, whether there have been any peaceful attempts or events 
which have had similar effects on inequality; and second, is there nowadays a possibility 
to level it? Neither land reforms, debt reliefs, economic crises have had a systematic 
negative effect on inequality. He states the same for democracy and education.55 
Another popular perspective yielded by Kuznets that was introduced before and which 
is meant to level inequality is economic development. But as a pioneering study with 
longitudinal data from 1998 shows, Trinidad and Tobago are the only two out of forty-
nine countries which would support the Kuznets thesis. Yet there are cases which call 
for Scheidelʼs attention. One strategy to identify equalizing economic forces lays in 
the analysis of countries that were not directly affected by the world wars and that in 
addition “have shown a significant reduction of income disparities” within recent years: 
with reference to Latin America.56 But according to Scheidelʼs analysis, favorable 
conditions that made this evolution possible could have come to an end. Scheidel 
continues, as he put it himself, with an “unremittingly bleak” message as millennia 
proved peaceful leveling to be an exceedingly rare phenomenon.
I was able to trace the concentration of resources in the hands of the few to 
two principal factors: economic development and predatory behavior by those 
powerful enough to appropriate wealth well in excess of what their activities 
might earn them in competitive markets – what economists call rent. These 
mechanisms remain active to the present day (p. 411).
Education, globalization, fiscal institutions, in concrete, tax progressivity – all these 
factors are embedded, waxing and waning in a political sphere that in these days comply 
with the interests of the elite. Unionization, high progressive taxes on both income 
and wealth came hand in hand with the disastrous experience of the world wars but 
55 The relationship between democracy and inequality is ever since accompanied by contradictory 
research findings. A recent study by Acemoglu and Robinson finds no consistent effect of democracy 
on income inequality – neither for the market nor for the disposable income inequality (Acemoglu and 
Robinson 2015).
56 Perhaps for the first time in recorded history, inequality fell across the region. In fourteen out of 
seventeen countries that have produced relevant data series, income Gini coefficients in 2010 were 
lower than they had been in 2000 (p. 381).
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are evaporating within the last few decades. Furthermore, he surpasses his analysis 
by the simple clarification that economic inequality is greater than it may seem.57 So 
what does the future hold according to Scheidel? When it comes to “recipes” against 
inequality, Scheidel names a long list of proposals and economists who mostly focus 
on tax reforms. But in his opinion, the ideas run short of attention to their scale of costs 
and benefits and lack both a “real-life political feasibility” and historical awareness (pp. 
433, 436). Even though Atkinsonʼs package of measures is “relatively modest”, there 
“seems to be surprisingly little interest in how to turn such proposals into reality” (p. 
436). Elaborating on the Four Horseman he assumes that they were ridden in the past 
and are unlikely to appear any time soon. Thus,
prospects of future leveling are poor [but] (a)ll of us who prize greater economic 
equality would do well to remember that with the rarest of exceptions, it was only 
ever brought forth in sorrow. Be careful what you wish for (pp. 443-444).
57 This has three reasons: First, the Gini coefficient which is most common tool to measure inequality 
tends to leave out the very highest incomes. Second, according to estimates by Zucman 2013, 8 
percent of world financial household wealth is hidden in tax havens. And third, whereas it is common 
to focus on relative indices (as Scheidel has done, too), absolute inequality would draw a more 
contrasting picture of income and wealth distribution (p. 424).
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Figure 9: The Mirrored Hourglass of (In)Equality
World Wars
Whatʼs next? 
Scheidel: “Be careful what you wish for.”
Source: Own elaboration.
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4. Same But Different
Even though the Four Angelists approach the same topic of vertical inequality, the 
reviews prove them to be different in many aspects. In this section I compare their 
works, summarizing the aspects in the form of a table. In the end, I provide a question. 
The answer to this question may help understand how it comes about that the messages 
of the authors vary (as in my opinion the categorization of neoliberal or not does not do 
justice). Beforehand I briefly integrate critical remarks as a review without reporting on 
deficiencies of scientific work would be incomplete; and furthermore, I believe pointing 
them out is like a litmus test for its robustness.
Once again, I start with Piketty. Whether or not one is to believe and follow Pikettyʼs 
findings does not diminish the validity of Krugmanʼs statement that he “has transformed 
our economic discourse; weʼll never talk about wealth and inequality the same way we 
used to” (Krugman 2014). The Economist even goes so far as to say that contemporary 
books on inequality have to be divided into published BC (Before Capital) or AP (After 
Piketty; The Economist 2015). As his work is provocative, it was to be expected that it 
would encounter criticism from many quarters. In particular two aspects received most 
critiques. The first refers to his explanation of high salaries of top earners. In this context, 
Donald Boudreaux has criticized Piketty’s reliance on insufficient microeconomic 
analysis and how he misses studies showing that wages of CEOs were highly related to 
the performance of companies (Boudreaux 2015). Even Krugman whose review is that 
“ink has been spilled glowingly”, speaks of a “significant disappointment” when it comes 
to Pikettyʼs argument on wage inequality (Krugman 2014; see also Syll 2014). Second, 
many reviewers target Pikettyʼs data, among others, Chris Giles from the Financial 
Times (Giles 2014). It was Piketty himself who after six days only, commented on the 
accusation. In Pikettyʼs opinion, Gilesʼ critique was neither constructive nor applicable 
as suggestions of how to improve the data first ignore important studies (like Saez and 
Zucman 2014) and second, Giles chose data which underestimate wealth inequality in 
general (Piketty 2014b: 2). Another point of criticism includes the ignorance of public 
pensions and benefits that the middle class in the US enjoys. This leads Piketty to 
paint a darker picture than reality actually is (Levmore 2015: 849, 854; see also Green 
2016). Furthermore, a critique which comes not by surprise is Milanovicʼs complaint 
against the “stickiness to r”.58 In addition, Milanovic states that Pikettyʼs formula r>g is 
lacking a theoretical background and has to be treated as “empirical proposition whose 
accurateness will be confirmed or not by future developments” (Milanovic 2014: 527). 
Whereas Milanovic recognizes the empirical foundation as a weakness, Romi Khosla 
58 As has been presented before, Milanovic prefers to focus on market income, thus before taxes, 
which is obviously opposed to a global tax on capital.
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states that it is the empirical evidence “which allows to move the discussion away from 
ideological and theoretical based conclusions” (Khosla 2015: 63). One further point of 
criticism I would like to add refers to Pikettyʼs formula. In order to inquire into the merits 
of income and wealth share tables he uses, Piketty criticizes the Gini and interdecile 
ratios (as often used by reports from the OECD). The problem he identifies is first the 
missing evolution of what happens between the top and bottom percentile and second, 
they often ignore the top end of the top shares (Piketty 2014: 266). The same is true for 
r>g: it is a ratio, too. Two countries could show the same records of r and g but have 
different levels of inequality.59 However, criticism on his work has come en masse; 
positive, negative, and everything in between. Yet whatever the critique has turned out 
to be, it must be acknowledged Piketty has kindled a broad discussion on top income 
shares and introduced a new theory on rising inequality (as Milanovic 2016 states, 
after more than half a century: 47). On the question as how inequality has had been 
able to rise, he answers with a formula which has the potential to become the new 
e=mc2. Focusing on Western countries and the time period from the French Revolution 
to the present, he relies on fiscal data to show inequality in the form of income and 
wealth share tables and reaches not only economists, but general educated readers 
alike (it has to be admitted, however, that they have to have perseverance to make it 
through this lengthy work). When it comes to providing a proposal as to what to do, he 
has a clear idea. With a view to his formula, he targets r and introduces the idea of a 
global (or at least regional) taxation of capital, emphasizing not only the ability but the 
very imperative to intervene in global processes in order to tackle the problem.
It was 1 AP (or 2 AP, as the French version of C21 was published in 2013) when 
Atkinson’s book was published, hence C21 and Inequality. What can be done? were 
being reviewed and put perceptibly in relation. Whereas some understand Atkinsonʼs 
work as a continuation which seeks to deepen Pikettyʼs findings (Harris 2015, Hollanders 
2016), others see a support which even achieves to “remove some doubt” (Sabnavis 
2015); while other reviewers state that the master still surpasses his disciple. As Tom 
Clark expresses it brilliantly, John Lennon once sang, “You say you want a revolution”, 
before adding a characteristic barb: “we’d all love to see the plan”. That is, as Clark 
clarifies, exactly what Atkinson contributed to the debate. Yet “Atkinson does not want 
a revolution (…) the Atkinson ambition is merely to narrow the gap in the UK to where it 
stood when he started [his academic career in the 1960s]” (Clark 2015). Atkinsonʼs work 
has not been spared criticism, calling his approaches either radical or outdated and thus 
without chance of being implemented by any government (Chu 2015, The Economist 
2015). Furthermore, some accuse him of treating various issues only superficially 
or at least not to a satisfying extent. Carina Fourie for instance, misses a more in-
59 For reflections on ratios and the decomposition of g, see Appendix.
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depth discussion why economic inequality should be understood as a real threat. But 
literature in political philosophy can, according to her, bridge this gap (Fourie 2015: 
4). Keeping in mind that further research in an interdisciplinary manner of this kind is 
exactly what Atkinson called for, Fourieʼs critique resembles the fulfillment of Atkinsonʼs 
wish rather than a negative appraisal. Most criticism points toward the Eurocentrism 
and Britain-focus of Atkinsonʼs analysis (Knee 2015, Sabnavis 2015 among others). 
On the contrary, Piketty identifies this point as a “main strength” because it shows that 
“governments have no real excuse for inaction” (Piketty 2015). In that sense, Atkinson 
is a “possibilist” par excellence as he searches for resources to reduce inequality that 
are “hidden, scattered, or badly utilized” (Hirschman 1988: 5). As Philipp Lepenies 
states, “possibilism looks for what can be done [highlighting by the author]” and one 
precondition is an “in-depth analysis of the individual patient before concluding which 
medical steps are possible in each case” (Lepenies 2008: 456, 457). With his analysis 
of the UK and other (mostly OECD) countries from the twentieth century to the present, 
using the most common inequality index Gini (and not the one named after him), the 
“Godfather” of measuring inequality not only offers the most concrete proposals to 
address the issue, but opens access to non-specialists due to his engagingly written 
style. As the “recipe” is written in a manner that anyone interested can understand, 
everyoneʼs awareness will conceive that the most important medicine is faith that the 
solutions lie in our hands.
The next author is also excellent in expressing his thoughts clearly. Milanovicʼs 
tremendous knowledge about inequality is expressed pointedly and framed by many 
anecdotes and graphs. To elaborate on both inequality within and among countries 
and in addition rehabilitate Kuznets hypothesis by a transformation from a curve to 
a wave in a “relatively short book” (Milanovic 2016: 7), proves him to be a virtuoso 
in the field of inequality. And yet, I have to disagree with him (and others, e.g. Green 
2016) from the beginning of his study in one aspect: I find his claim that this book was 
written for general readers with interest (and not for economists only) not fulfilled. 
Several times he offers “Excurses” to explain concepts, methods or to introduce 
important historical occurrences. But some remain unexplained and without economic 
background knowledge (as for example what “higher elasticity of substitution” means or 
Malthusian checks are), it would be difficult to follow. Nevertheless, these occurrences 
are the exception to the rule as most arguments, and by far more important, the overall 
direction of his ideas can be traced. However, a threefold biting criticism comes from 
Anthony Annett from the IMF (Annett 2016). In the first place, technological revolutions 
(as labeled by Milanovic) must not be understood as a driving force for inequality as 
four to six technological waves since the late eighteenth century can be identified (and 
they did not bring an upswing in inequality). Next, Annett accuses Milanovic of being 
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“murky” regarding the turning point of the wave. As in the explanation for the outbreak 
of World War I, Milanovic identifies inequality itself as the reason for the disastrous 
mass violence that finally brought a reduction. As Annett notes, “Milanovic takes us 
to the precipice, but then pulls back” as he does not explain what this means for our 
future. Out of this derives the third critical point: when talking about malign forces, he 
leaves out “one of the greatest malign economic forces of the 21st century, climate 
change, which could spell catastrophe for income distribution both within and between 
countries.” Indeed, while Milanovic discusses migration broadly, he does not take into 
account the aforementioned factor that forces mass migration movements all over 
the globe. Another point of critique I find is the discrepancy between data and graphs: 
first, for the upswing in inequality since the 1980s, his findings do not match with the 
assumptions deriving from the Kuznets waves. At certain points, Milanovic himself 
acknowledges these disparities (only the US and UK fit in their entirety; Milanovic 2016: 
79, 81). Secondly, a faulty presentation of data in graphs discredits his arguments 
instead of supporting them. The statistical support for his hypothesis, as David Dodwell 
states, is without doubt compelling (Dodwell 2016). It is, then, all the more regrettable 
to find a downswing of a curve where data remain constant.60 This criticism in mind, it 
remains that Milanovic has managed to shift the focus to the global level, away not only 
from analyses within countries but also broadening the picture by putting an end to the 
dominance of Eurocentrism. As Milanovic understands politics as endogenous to the 
economy, it would not be wisest to concentrate on (national) taxation as globalization 
and technological processes define the frame in which (national) politics is able to 
evolve. In his opinion it makes more sense to concentrate on market income and 
interventions before taxes, likewise through higher investments in education (Milanovic 
2016: 221).
If asked for recipes against extreme and rising levels of inequality, Scheidel would 
question the question and answer twofold: first, statistics like from Oxfam (p. 1) are 
“perfectly normal” ever since mankind has had recorded an economic surplus (Sheidel 
2017: 62, see also Mann 2017); and second: the moral of his(s)tory is that mass violence 
alone has had been able to level inequality. Thus, the counter question is: do we want 
inequality to shrink? This consistent pessimistic view is what most reviewers disagree 
upon, arguing that Scheidel pushes the importance of World War I and II too far, ignoring 
thereby institutional arrangements and processes of leveling that have been under way 
beforehand and have been rather thwarted than caused by the wars (Mann 2017, Bavel 
2018 among others). Furthermore, as Scheidel concentrates on the state level only, he 
60 In a graph in which Milanovic brings his (and Lakners) work together with the work of Bourguignon 
and Morrison (2002), the curve drops while data provided by Bourguignon and Morrison (2002) stay 
at the same level.
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denies that it was not constantly an adequate level to draw general conclusions (Bavel 
2018: 370). However, his extensive historical analysis of inequality with an eclectic 
approach and the wide range of measuring tools covering thousands of years and 
all areas from around the globe is impressive and shows that using archeology may 
help to trace the origins and development of inequality. But Kohler and Smith find fault 
with Scheidelʼs fondness for written documents; in their opinion he could have further 
deepened his gaze into the archaeological past (Kohler and Smith 2018: 4). If following 
works on the history of inequality even broaden the toolkit Scheidel has used, I think 
that will not diminish his accomplishments and contribution. As mentioned in the third 
section, Scheidel refers to the other three authors. He also discusses possible actions 
against inequality and states about Atkinsonʼs book that it is “(t)he most detailed and 
precise equalization program that has been put forward to date” (Scheidel 2017: 434). 
Nevertheless, he considers any kind of political intervention to be only a drop in the 
ocean as he repeatedly stresses that nothing but the Four Horsemen have been able 
to tackle inequality.
Mann criticizes his deterministic perspective according to which for instance Scheidel 
assumes “that the result of the two world wars was given” (Mann 2017: 88). And as 
Bavel puts it, he attributes institutional arrangements some importance, yet this is “a 
slight one” (Bavel 2018: 379). It can therefore be concluded that Scheidel, just as 
Milanovic, understands politics as being primarily determined by economic conditions.
After the review of the Four Angelists, Table 2 below summarizes the findings.
I would group Piketty and Atkinson together as they understand politics as being 
outside of economics, and able to change the course of events; in contrast, Milanovic 
and Scheidel understand politics as endogenous to the economy and little or nothing 
can change the course of inequality. Yet I admit that Piketty and Atkinson are more 
similar to each other than are Milanovic and Scheidel.
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Table 2: Same But Different – the Four Angelists in Comparison
Same but 
different
Piketty (2014) Atkinson (2015) Milanovic (2016) Scheidel (2017)






	 Provide a 
theoretical and 
data basis
	 Give an answer 
to the question 
“What can be 
done?”
	 Raise awareness 
it can be done
	 Lead the focus on 
the global level














	 Revolution: focus 
on top income 
shares
	 New theory on 
rising inequality
	 Offers most 
concrete 
proposals
	 Opens access to 
non-specialists 
due to its 
engagingly written 
style
	 Emphasizes the 
global perspective
	 New approach
	 Raise awareness 
for recorded 
history
	 Promotes eclectic 
methods
Question Why did inequality 
rise?
How can inequality be 
tackled?
Why did inequality 
rise?
What caused 
inequality to grow and 
decline?
Approach r > g
(dismisses Kuznets)
Concrete proposals Kuznets circles or 
waves
Eclectic (p. 39)







Time frame French Revolution to 
the present
Twentieth century to 
the present
Pre-Industrial 
Revolution to the 
present
(and since 1988)
Before Holocene to 
the present
(mostly Ancient 





















	 General educated 
reader with 
perseverance
General reader 	 Economists






Global taxation of 
capital




of politics to 
economy
Exogenous Exogenous Endogenous Endogenous
(Subliminal) 
Message
Be wary of any 
economic determinism 
in regard to 
inequalities of wealth 
and income
Solutions for problems 
of inequality lie in our 
hands
New capitalism is 
a threat to social 
democracy
Be careful what you 
wish
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As I showed in the first section, Miles Corak offers the explanation for different 
approaches in dependence of ideological predispositions. The story one tells depends 
on whether you have a collectivist view, you are afraid of market failures and understand 
government as a necessary force for good, or if you are libertarian, trust the market 
forces and do not want government to intervene (Corak 2016: 369). Saul Levmore 
argues that “reasons [for more or less progressive taxation] are weighted differently 
according to oneʼs political intuitions” (Levmore 2015: 851). I take issue with these 
categories by arguing threefold: first, instrumentally, as I think that the debate on liberal 
or not, or of political intuitions, is out of place when we call for more interdisciplinary 
analysis and discussion. Theories of economists are without any doubt important, even 
indispensable. But they do not underpin thoughts of researchers and practitioners 
outside economics who also deal with inequality. Second, as presented, the four 
authors Piketty, Atkinson, Milanovic and Scheidel tell different stories. Piketty and 
Atkinson, this is clear, are politically far away from being in line with liberals. But it 
would be also inappropriate to label either Scheidel (see first argument) or Milanovic 
as such. Milanovic is against the focus on taxation; yet he sees the responsibility of the 
government to intervene; for instance, he proposes to equalize the quality of schools 
and workers to receive a share from their companies (Milanovic 2016: 221). These 
proposals can also be found in Second Treatise of Government, John Locke’s most 
important political work (Locke 2007 [1689], Section 4, Section 27). He also advocated 
for intervention by government whenever necessary as inequality should not be 
allowed to increase unchecked. Milanovicʼs and Lockeʼs ideas would be countered 
by Hayek and Friedman; thus he proves to be more in line with the first than with the 
latter two – and is not part of the neoliberal group. And third, it is time to “recognize 
that we are at the end of an era” as “the zeitgeist had changed (…) Neoliberalism has 
had its day” (Jacques 2016). A “movement toward a new paradigm” – away from the 
Washington Consensus (defined as policy paradigm of free market fundamentalism) – 
“is in progress” (Lütz 2015: 85).
I argue that the question and reason behind the different approaches is another: politics 
or economy – which is the master that defines the space for action? Most economists 
subscribe to what Ulrich von Weizsäcker stated in a speech in 2012: that it is the 
economy that sets the tone what “Politik” has to do (“Es ist die Wirtschaft die der Politik 
die Hausaufgaben diktiert”, Von Weizsäcker 2012). This group consists of the ones 
that believe that politics is endogenous to economy. But when it comes to this question, 
opinions tend to differ sharply.61 Others believe politics to be exogenous; a sphere for 
itself according to the definition that it is politics that defines the generally binding rules 
for a society – fiscal policy included. The first expects that there is not much we can 
61 Milanovic stresses this difference between him and Piketty on p. 94; I point this out on pp. 23, 34, 57.
      trAndeS Working Paper Series No. 6, 2018 | 57
(or even should) accomplish as in times of globalization and ongoing technological 
progress, economic forces outside the sphere of our (national) influence define the 
frame in which we can operate.62 The second assumes that politics and society may, 
in a joint effort, change (or even reverse) the pattern as globalization and technological 
progress are not bestowed by God or nature but something that people collectively are 
able to decide upon. Thus, while the first group says we can do little (compared to the 
powers and factors that lie not in our hands), the latter call for a first step to realize that 
we are not powerless and leashed in chains and in a second step to overturn the idea 
of powerlessness. This requires more than an individual, but a collective effort based 
upon a democratic debate.
Imagine a gigantic hourglass (or see Figure 10 on the next page): whereas ones argue 
that time (in form of sand) passes through and there is nothing one can do; the others 
believe to the contrary: that the power lies in our hands and we can stop an ongoing 
increase in inequality. Yet one alone is not enough to make a change – and topple the 
hourglass.
62 This is in stark contrast to the neoliberal belief that interventions into the market are per se bad –
 rather they are understood as insufficient.
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Figure 10: Toppling the Hourglass
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5. Appendix
5.1 A Brief Reflection on Data
An important aspect to be taken into account while analyzing inequality is the data one 
works with: “In seeking to draw lessons from statistics on inequality, we have to be 
confident in the quality of the data we are using” (Atkinson 2015: 45). As comparability 
is key to research, even though one hundred percent will not be reachable, used data 
should be harmonized – as offered by the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS; covering 
50 countries) or the collection of secondary data from United Nations University-World 
Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER; covering more than 150 
countries). Household surveys bear several limitations, as they exclude people who 
do not live in households and are concentrated on lower range incomes (as Atkinson 
puts it, there is good reason to suppose that better-offs tend to reply at a lower rate) so 
that the upper tail of the distribution may be under-represented. Income tax data are 
another source. In this case it is important to not forget that they are a “by-product” and 
that tax avoidance and evasion also skew the results. Other data sources exist and 
can and should be taken into account, too, such as data on earnings, data on wealth 
and published tabulations from the past.
5.2 A Brief Reflection on the Ratio of r and g
The ratio of r and g offers an explanation for a growing accumulation of capital and 
thus an expanding inequality. But in order to make a real comparison and statement of 
inequality possible, growth g should be decomposed. A simple calculation shows why: 
imagine two countries both with r=5 percent and g=1.5 percent, for simplicityʼs sake, 
they keep this ratio for a long period. All factors of importance may start at the same 
level, even the taxation on r may be equal. If g is differently distributed, for instance in 
country A the top decileʼs share of growth (of 1.5 percent) is 0.5, the next 40 percent 
receive 0.5 and so does the poorer half. In country B the top decile benefits with 1.2 
out of 1.5 percent of growth, the next 40 percent get 0.2 and the poorer half nearly 
nothing, only 0.1 percent of the total economic growth. As is known, the accumulation 
of any kind of income is a long-term process. But after a long time, even though both 
countries have the same r/g ratio, inequalities are different as the population benefits to 
varying degrees. Of course, this is just a simple model that leaves out considerations 
like a growing inequality which in turn could have consequences for further years, 
changing the growth rate, etc. . However, the same critique which Piketty addresses 
towards the Gini coefficient and the ratios used by OECD can be applied to his ratio of 
r and g.
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